# AFF AT: DA—DoD O/S

### AT: GPC !

#### “Strategic competition” is meaningless and counterproductive

Nexon 21 Daniel H. Nexon, Professor in the Department of Government and at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Against Great Power Competition,” Foreign Affairs, 2-15-2021, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-02-15/against-great-power-competition> /GoGreen!

In his first days in office, U.S. President Joe Biden has worked to signal a clean break with his predecessor. He rejoined the Paris climate accord, offered to extend the New START nuclear weapons treaty, and reversed the “Mexico City” policy curtailing overseas abortion access. His appointees have repeatedly emphasized that the administration will prioritize diplomacy and multilateralism over former President Donald Trump’s “America first” nationalism.

But the fate of a central plank of Trump’s foreign policy remains uncertain: the focus on great-power competition, which according to his administration’s National Security Strategy has “returned.” In a major address at the U.S. State Department, Biden underscored his intention to “work with Beijing when it’s in America’s interests to do so,” but days later noted the likelihood of “extreme competition” with China. This rhetoric may reflect either pragmatism or that great-power competition is on its way to assuming a dominant place in Biden administration policy. Even if Biden aims to de-emphasize competition in certain areas, though, Republicans are certain to criticize the administration for being weak and ineffective in the face of international challenges. Absent some major change in the global threat environment, great-power competition will remain a focal point in debates over U.S. foreign and national security policy.

This is unfortunate. For all the concept’s influence in recent years, great-power competition is not a coherent framework for U.S. foreign policy. Treating it as a guiding principle of American grand strategy risks confusing means and ends, wasting limited resources on illusory threats, and undermining cooperation on immediate security challenges, such as climate change and nuclear nonproliferation. In the long run, a fixation on great-power competition is likely to undermine, rather than enhance, U.S. power and influence.

THE PROBLEM WITH COMPETITION

According to the Trump administration’s 2018 National Defense Strategy, “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.” Just a year later, the analyst Uri Friedman observed in The Atlantic that great-power competition was now “invoked from Aspen to Israel to South Korea, and by U.S. officials making the case for all sorts of policies.” The phrase, he noted, “has even achieved hallowed acronym status” in the form of “GPC.” Some in Washington see it as a sequel to the original Cold War, with China taking over for the Soviet Union. Others look to more traditional geopolitical rivalries as a model.

Great-power competition’s newfound popularity reflects real facts on the ground. Indeed, competition among great powers cannot return, because it never really went away. Rivalries between leading states exist in every international system. Even during the 1990s—the height of the “unipolar moment”—the United States and Russia competed in the Balkans; the United States and France competed in parts of Africa; and multiple states competed for influence in Central Asia.

But with Washington’s unipolar status now on the wane, powers such as China and Russia find it easier than they once did to challenge U.S. leadership. Since states tend to consider overt antagonism a more attractive option when they expect to come out on top, there will inevitably be more competition among great powers as U.S. relative power declines. With Washington on the back foot, foreign leaders see a chance to gain economically, advance their security interests, and challenge existing norms, rules, or their position in the international pecking order.

It is one thing, though, for Washington to observe increasing competition among great powers and adjust to a world in which it enjoys less influence than it once did. It is another entirely to elevate competition itself to the guiding paradigm of U.S. foreign policy—as the Trump administration proposed and Biden may wind up doing. The mere fact of a more competitive international environment does not compel states to engage in unrelenting struggle. Instead, periods of intense interstate rivalry happen when great powers choose—sometimes as a matter of grand strategy, other times through the accretion of individual tactical decisions—to prioritize conflict over cooperation. Nothing, for instance, requires the United States to push back against every peripheral challenge to its influence, status, or policy preferences. Not every move by Moscow or Beijing constitutes a direct threat to Washington’s national interests.

It is also misguided to think, as some have suggested, that great-power competition makes norms, rules, and other aspects of international order (liberal or otherwise) irrelevant. Even during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union worked out a variety of formal and informal rules that helped them manage competition, limit nuclear proliferation, and otherwise structure international relations. Breaking those rules meant real reputational costs, as the number of covert interventions during the Cold War attests. Both sides of the conflict faced stiff resistance when they violated norms of sovereignty or national self-determination.

These norms, rules, and institutions often complement power politics. They serve as both objects and instruments of great-power contestation. In the nineteenth century, for instance, the German statesman Otto von Bismarck appealed to shared norms in a successful effort to reduce European resistance to German unification. Today, the United States draws much of its relative power from institutional arrangements—notably its unrivaled network of alliances and partnerships—that frequently reflect and derive legitimacy from liberal values.

These relationships underscore a central problem with treating great-power competition as the organizing principle of foreign policy: it provides very little in the way of guidance to policymakers. There is no single grand strategy for eras of great-power competition. There are no instruments of statecraft that competition renders relevant or irrelevant. Great-power competition doesn’t even imply adopting a more antagonistic approach to rivals: as U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev realized by 1987, the best response to intensifying competition may be to dial tensions back through confidence-building measures and cooperation.

Such indeterminacy helps explain the concept’s widespread appeal: one can use great-power competition to justify almost anything. In the 1990s, the United States needed enormous military budgets to prevent the emergence of new great-power competitors. Now it needs them to compete with existing ones. Liberals once called for major investments in infrastructure, education, and research to sustain American primacy. Now they call for them to keep the United States competitive in a multipolar world. Great-power competition might require strategic retrenchment, or offshore balancing, or deep engagement. Perhaps it means that Washington must give up its liberal illusions and pursue unbridled and unilateral realpolitik. Or maybe the United States needs to commit to multilateralism and more equitable relationships with allies.

#### Their impact theorizations overstate the scope of competition – it’s NOT all-encompassing, revisionism is selective – our advantages have greater explanatory power – theirs backfire

Ashford 21 Emma Ashford, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, “Great-Power Competition Is a Recipe for Disaster,” Foreign Policy, 4-1-2021, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/01/china-usa-great-power-competition-recipe-for-disaster/> /GoGreen!

“America is back,” blared headlines following President Joe Biden’s speech to the Munich Security Conference in February, an address clearly designed to draw a line under the Donald Trump presidency and mark a new start in trans-Atlantic relations. “We are not looking backward,” Biden promised. “We are looking forward, together.” Yet one big plank of the Trump administration’s foreign policy is apparently sticking around: great-power competition. “We must prepare together for a long-term strategic competition,” Biden told conference attendees, adding that “competition with China is going to be stiff.”

Unfortunately, for all that great-power competition has been Washington’s favorite buzzword in recent years, it remains frustratingly poorly defined. Indeed, most commentators skip right past the big questions (Why are we competing? Competing over what?) and go straight to arguing about how to achieve victory. Since the possible answers to these questions range from the entirely reasonable (i.e., that Western states should engage in collective defense of liberal democracy) to the dangerous and utterly unrealistic (i.e., that Washington should be pursuing regime collapse in Beijing), it’s hardly something we should ignore.

It seems that once again—just as it did during the global war on terrorism in the mid-2000s or when styling the United States as the indispensable nation in the 1990s—Washington’s strategic community is again reorienting itself around a new, poorly theorized model of the world and of America’s place in it. Yet precisely because it is so ill-defined, great-power competition as a strategy—that is to say, competition for its own sake—also has the potential to be highly dangerous.

It is a mark of how recently the notion of great-power competition has entered the Washington lexicon that someone who had fallen into a coma just five years ago might never have heard the phrase. Though the Obama administration’s 2015 National Military Strategy warned of states “attempting to revise key aspects of the international order,” it was not until the Trump era that the term itself entered widespread use. Then-U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis said in June 2017 that a “return to great-power competition … places the international order under assault,” while the National Security Strategy released later that year noted that “after being dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition returned.” Since then, its growth has been exponential.

As a description, great-power competition is accurate; competition among the great powers is a defining feature of the international environment. Whether one is talking about 16th-century rivalries among empires, the imperialist scramble for Africa, or the Cold War struggle between the capitalist and communist blocs, states have always jockeyed for power and influence. But the notion that it is new—or that it is returning as if history were taking its revenge—is somewhat absurd. As the Georgetown University professor Daniel Nexon recently put it, “competition among great powers cannot return, because it never really went away.”

Instead, the “return of great-power competition” is essentially an easier way of admitting that the United States is in relative decline. The unipolar moment—the three-decade period of U.S. global predominance that started with the collapse of the Soviet Union—is ending. In the parlance of political science, other states are beginning to balance against the United States. In layman’s terms, this means that with the United States in relative decline, other states are increasingly willing to take actions they would not have during the 1990s, whether it’s Russian intervention in Syria, Chinese claims to the South China Sea, or European steps to circumvent U.S. sanctions legislation. Irving Kristol, considered the godfather of neoconservatism, once noted that a neoconservative is just a liberal who’s been mugged by reality; some of the loudest voices proclaiming an era of great-power competition are just liberal internationalists who have been mugged by the reality of power politics.

Yet if this were all there was to it, the debate surrounding great-power competition would be far less problematic. Scholars and pundits would update their mental models for a more competitive world and move on with their lives. Instead, foreign-policy circles in Washington are increasingly fixated on the notion that the United States must commit to competition with China, Russia, and other states.

Great-power competition is portrayed less as a fact of life and more as a strategy in and of itself. Certainly, some authors do suggest a potential endpoint to great-power competition, such as Hal Brands and Zack Cooper, whose recent piece in Foreign Policy argued that competition between the United States and China would only lessen when the regime in Beijing collapsed. But they are still unclear on why we should pursue an existential Cold War-style struggle with China, rather than a more measured approach of competitive coexistence.

This example is emblematic of the debate on great-power competition as a whole. As a grand strategy—what the Yale University professor John Lewis Gaddis once described as “the calculated relationship of means to large ends”—great-power competition is sorely lacking. For starters, it’s not clear whether competition is itself a means or an end.

The 2017 National Security Strategy, for example, describes the world as an “arena of continuous competition” for which the United States must prepare. Whether it is domestic infrastructure projects, student loan forgiveness, repairs to democratic institutions, or increasing the birth rate, a wide range of policy priorities are now portrayed as essential to the pursuit of great-power competition. This suggests that great-power competition is itself an end. Why the country is compelled to compete in this way typically goes unstated.

Indeed, if great-power competition is instead a means to an end, it’s not at all clear what those ends are. There’s rarely a concrete goal among those who proselytize in favor of a strategy of great-power competition. Consider how the topic is portrayed by former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster in his recent book. He opens by noting that “after the end of the Cold War, America and other free and open societies forgot that they had to compete to keep their freedom, security, and prosperity” while later arguing that states must “compete thoroughly as the best means of avoiding confrontation.” Confusingly, he portrays competition as both an alternative to conflict and as a Manichean struggle between good and evil, with the United States beset by adversaries on all sides.

It’s easy to dismiss this kind of rhetoric as silly, but it also carries substantial danger. For one thing, the focus on competition masks a whole series of underlying assumptions about the international system and America’s role in it. Washington’s policy community appears convinced that we are headed for a more dangerous world, one in which the United States must push back against the perceived aggression of states like China and Russia. Though articles almost always include an obligatory aside—that cooperation with China on climate change is a must!—the frame is almost uniformly confrontational.

To be clear, there are good reasons for Washington’s strategic community to perceive an increasingly competitive world. The gap between the United States and other countries is narrowing militarily; it has already closed by some economic measures. And pushback against U.S. foreign-policy choices among other states has increased in recent years, from Chinese attempts to revise maritime rules to Russia’s aggressive targeting of foreign elections. But a more competitive world isn’t the same thing as an all-out struggle. Great-power competition is often portrayed as an all-or-nothing conflict, where revisionist autocracies are challenging the United States in every sphere. In reality, thus far China and Russia are only selectively revisionist, attempting to change the status quo where it suits their interests and to maintain it in other places.

The risks of the all-or-nothing approach to global politics cannot be overstated. As Fareed Zakaria put it recently, “The United States risks squandering the hard-won gains from four decades of engagement with China, encouraging Beijing to adopt confrontational policies of its own, and leading the world’s two largest economies into a treacherous conflict of unknown scale and scope.” Indeed, if one assumes—as much of the writing on great-power competition does—that China and Russia are implacable foes of the United States determined to destroy the existing order and overturn U.S. hegemony, then policies that would otherwise be unthinkable are suddenly on the table.

Military buildup in Europe and Asia becomes necessary, even if it raises the risk of open conflict with another nuclear power. Economic decoupling seems vital to protect supply chains, though studies show that the costs to U.S. companies and workers would be extreme. A recent report by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s China Center, for example, estimated that the U.S. economy could lose up to $1 trillion in growth if tariffs were more broadly applied to all U.S.-China trade. Restrictions on tourism or on Chinese students studying in the United States would cost between $15 billion and $30 billion per year.

The bottom line is simple: It’s easy to make fun of great-power competition as a meaningless buzzword or as Washington’s foreign-policy elite rediscovering that other states get to have a say in world politics. But as the political scientist Robert Kagan wrote recently, the biggest question of the coming decades may be whether countries can “confine the global competition to the economic and political realms and thus spare themselves and the world from the horrors of the next great war or even the still frightening confrontations of another cold war.” In that context, the blind pursuit of a strategy of great-power competition is irresponsible and shortsighted.

The last time the United States single-mindedly pursued a poorly thought-out slogan masquerading as a strategy, it ended up fighting a two-decade global war on terrorism, a conflict from which it is still struggling to extricate itself and that had immense negative effects on the country’s foreign relations and its domestic liberties. Yet if today’s leaders are not careful, the rhetoric of great-power competition could drag the United States into a conflict even more costly and damaging.

#### No impact to losing – and “rules-based order” is NOT at stake

Fettweis 20 – Dr. Christopher Fettweis, Professor at Tulane University’s Department of Political Science, President of the board of the World Affairs Council of New Orleans, PhD from the University of Maryland, adjunct scholar in the Cato Institute’s Defense and Foreign Policy Studies Department; “Delusions of Danger: Geopolitical Fear and Indispensability in U.S. Foreign Policy;” 06-03-20, Cato Institute, <https://www.cato.org/publications/delusions-danger-geopolitical-fear-indispensability-us-foreign-policy>; Go Green! \*added [obfuscate]

The Indispensable Nation

Although geopolitical fear prevents current international empirical realities from receiving a fair evaluation by U.S. society, another belief prescribes a specific approach to foreign policy, one that mandates a far higher level of international activism than would otherwise be warranted. Both are based on thin intellectual foundations, and together they encourage a variety of ill‐​advised policies on the part of the United States. According to what might be considered the indispensability fallacy, many Americans believe that U.S. actions are primarily responsible for any stability that currently exists. “All that stands between civility and genocide, order and mayhem,” explain Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol, “is American power.“37 That belief is an offshoot, witting or not, of what is known as “hegemonic stability theory,” which proposes that international peace is possible only when one country is strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules.38 Were U.S. leaders to abdicate their responsibilities, that reasoning goes, unchecked conflicts would at the very least bring humanitarian disaster and would quite quickly threaten core U.S. interests.39

Brzezinski is typical in his belief that “outright chaos” and a string of specific horrors could be expected to follow a loss of hegemony, from renewed attempts to build regional empires (by China, Turkey, Russia, and Brazil) to the collapse of the U.S. relationship with Mexico as emboldened nationalists south of the border reassert 150‐​year‐​old territorial claims. Overall, without U.S. dominance, today’s relatively peaceful world would turn “violent and bloodthirsty.“40 The liberal world order that is so beneficial to all would come tumbling down.

Like many believers, proponents of hegemonic stability theory base their view on faith alone.41 There is precious little evidence to suggest that the United States is responsible for the pacific trends that have swept across the system. In fact, the world remained equally peaceful, relatively speaking, while the United States cut its forces throughout the 1990s, as well as while it doubled its military spending in the first decade of the new century.42 Complex statistical methods should not be needed to demonstrate that levels of U.S. military spending have been essentially unrelated to global stability.

Hegemonic stability theory’s flaws go way beyond the absence of simple correlations to support them, however. The theory’s supporters have never been able to explain adequately how precisely 5 percent of the world’s population could force peace on the other 95 percent, unless, of course, the rest of the world was simply not intent on fighting. Most states are quite free to go to war without U.S. involvement but choose not to. The United States can be counted on, especially after Iraq, to steer well clear of most civil wars and ethnic conflicts. It took years, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and the use of chemical weapons to spur even limited interest in the events in Syria, for example; surely internal violence in, say, most of Africa would be unlikely to attract serious attention of the world’s policeman, much less intervention. The continent is, nevertheless, more peaceful today than at any other time in its history, something for which U.S. hegemony cannot take credit.43 Stability exists today in many such places to which U.S. hegemony simply does not extend.

Overall, proponents of the stabilizing power of U.S. hegemony should keep in mind one of the most basic observations from cognitive psychology: rarely are our actions as important to others’ calculations as we perceive them to be.44 The so‐​called egocentric bias, which is essentially ubiquitous in human interaction, suggests that although it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly overestimating their own importance. Washington is probably not as central to the myriad decisions in foreign capitals that help maintain international stability as it thinks it is.

The indispensability fallacy owes its existence to a couple of factors. First, although all people like to bask in the reflected glory of their country’s (or culture’s) unique, nonpareil stature, Americans have long been exceptional in their exceptionalism.45 The short history of the United States, which can easily be read as an almost uninterrupted and certainly unlikely story of success, has led to a (perhaps natural) belief that it is morally, culturally, and politically superior to other, lesser countries. It is no coincidence that the exceptional state would be called on by fate to maintain peace and justice in the world.

Americans have always combined that feeling of divine providence with a sense of mission to spread their ideals around the world and battle evil wherever it lurks. It is that sense of destiny, of being the object of history’s call, that most obviously separates the United States from other countries. Only an American president would claim that by entering World War I, “America had the infinite privilege of fulfilling her destiny and saving the world.“46

Although many states are motivated by humanitarian causes, no other seems to consider promoting its values to be a national duty in quite the same way that Americans do. “I believe that God wants everybody to be free,” said George W. Bush in 2004. “That’s what I believe. And that’s one part of my foreign policy.“47 When Madeleine Albright called the United States the “indispensable nation,” she was reflecting a traditional, deeply held belief of the American people.48 Exceptional nations, like exceptional people, have an obligation to assist the merely average.

Many of the factors that contribute to geopolitical fear — Manichaeism, religiosity, various vested interests, and neoconservatism — also help explain American exceptionalism and the indispensability fallacy. And unipolarity makes hegemonic delusions possible. With the great power of the United States comes a sense of great responsibility: to serve and protect humanity, to drive history in positive directions. More than any other single factor, the people of the United States tend to believe that they are indispensable because they are powerful, and power tends to [obfuscate] ~~blind~~ states to their limitations. “Wealth shapes our international behavior and our image,” observed Derek Leebaert. “It brings with it the freedom to make wide‐​ranging choices well beyond common sense.“49 It is quite likely that the world does not need the United States to enforce peace. In fact, if virtually any of the overlapping and mutually reinforcing explanations for the current stability are correct, the trends in international security may well prove difficult to reverse. None of the contributing factors that are commonly suggested (economic development, complex interdependence, nuclear weapons, international institutions, democracy, shifting global norms on war) seem poised to disappear any time soon.50 The world will probably continue its peaceful ways for the near future, at the very least, no matter what the United States chooses to do or not do. As Robert Jervis concluded while pondering the likely effects of U.S. restraint on decisions made in foreign capitals, “It is very unlikely that pulling off the American security blanket would lead to thoughts of war.“51 The United States will remain fundamentally safe no matter what it does — in other words, despite widespread beliefs in its inherent indispensability to the contrary.

### AT: Alliances !

#### No war from abandonment nor entanglement

Fisher 16 Max Fisher, foreign editor at Vox, former reporter and founding editor of the WorldViews foreign affair blog at The Washington Post, MA International Relations and Affairs, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, “The Credibility Trap,” Vox, 4-29-2016, <https://www.vox.com/2016/4/29/11431808/credibility-foreign-policy-war> /GoGreen!

If reputational credibility has been so repeatedly debunked, both in specific instances and as a theory, why does it continue to loom so large in America's foreign policy discourse?

Tufts University's Michael Beckley hinted at one possible explanation in a much-discussed article last year in International Security: Could it have something to do with America's uniquely broad network of alliances?

Beckley's article was actually asking a different question — whether those alliances lead the US to war, by allowing allies to "entangle" it in foreign conflict. (Beckley concludes the answer is no; other scholars have disputed his findings.)

But, in reviewing so-called "entanglement theory," Beckley points out that reputational credibility, even if it doesn't exist in the world, is something that definitely exists in the minds of foreign leaders and foreign policy decision-makers.

"The alliance comes to be perceived as an end in itself, transcending the more concrete national security interests for which it was initially conceived," political scientist Jack Levy wrote in a well-known 1981 paper (which Beckley cites). Here's the key quote:

Political decision makers come to believe that support for one's allies, regardless of its consequences, is essential for their national prestige, and that the failure to provide support would ultimately result in their diplomatic isolation in a hostile and threatening world.

So it's not that reputation is a real thing that compels states to act in a certain way, but rather that individual decision-makers are driven by their own mistaken belief in reputation. As a result, Beckley writes, "reputational concerns can drive states into wars over trivial interests in peripheral places."

Some scholars, including Levy, argue that America's allies promote the idea of reputation, as a means to convince the United States to commit more resources to serve their own interests.

Foreign leaders do seem to become awfully preoccupied with American credibility when they want the US to take military action on their behalf. When the US failed to bomb Syria in 2013, for example, Syria's enemies in the region — Arab leaders who are also allied with the US — declared that American credibility was at stake.

"I think I believe in American power more than Obama does," Jordan's King Abdullah II said of Obama's decision to not bomb Syria.

This comes at a time when the US has grown unusually indulgent of its allies, as Jeremy Shapiro and Richard Sokolsky argue in a recent article. This has made American policymakers more likely to heed allies' demands and take their claims at face value.

But Dartmouth's Jennifer Lind finds evidence that allies make this argument only opportunistically, and almost always about conflicts in which they are directly involved. They might speak in the language of reputation theory, but their behavior suggests that they do not really believe in it.

Reputation theory, after all, says that America's allies would want the US to intervene as much as possible in other conflicts, when in fact the opposite is usually true.

### AT: Demo I/L

#### SC can’t solve democracy

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There are many good reasons to host such a gathering. It’s smart politics, fulfills a campaign commitment and counters the perception, fostered by President Donald Trump, that America is no longer interested in promoting democracy and human rights. But as a geopolitical instrument, drawing lines between democracies and autocracies is not only certain to disappoint — it’s also a deeply flawed organizing principle for America’s approach to the world.

China and Russia, which Biden has also singled out for criticism, are not the main causes of the weakening of democracies around the world. Most of the backsliding, according to a recent study, has been caused by erosion within the world’s democracies, including the United States and many of its allies. Indeed, the upcoming summit includes a number of countries — India, Brazil, the Philippines and Poland among them — marked by growing autocratic movements and infringements on freedom of expression and a free press. And pushing these and other countries to reform their political, electoral or judicial institutions from the outside is hard if not impossible.

Biden isn’t the first and won’t be the last American president to make democracy promotion central to his foreign policy. Woodrow Wilson wanted to make the world “safe for democracy”; Franklin Roosevelt promulgated the Atlantic Charter. The Clinton administration was present at the creation of the Community of Democracies. George W. Bush had his Freedom Agenda and talked about ridding the world of dictators. All found democracy promotion a useful tool to advance U.S. values and interests.

Biden seems to genuinely believe that democrats and dictators are in a do-or-die battle over who will own the 21st century. Though he insists that he doesn’t want a new cold war, some of his overcharged rhetoric belies this view. In March, Biden announced his intention “to invite an alliance of democracies to come here to discuss the future,” including holding “China accountable to follow the rules” on issues such as persecution of its Uyghur citizens and its territorial disputes with Taiwan. Biden has said of China’s President Xi Jinping that he “doesn’t have a democratic bone . . . in his body” and that Xi believes “democracy cannot keep up with” China.

It is simplistic to believe, however, that Chinese and Russian foreign policies are driven by the ideological impulse to spread autocracy. Both countries see the United States as their main geopolitical adversary and seek to undermine American influence and alliances wherever they can; the Chinese are also bent on outcompeting the United States in 21st-century technologies.

But the Russians don’t have an authoritarian model for export, and other autocratic-minded governments don’t need inspiration from Moscow to run kleptocratic, corrupt, repressive and misgoverned regimes. Putin’s overriding priority is self-preservation and the preservation of his regime. What evidence is there that he believes these objectives can be achieved only if the rest of the world looks like Russia?

Likewise, Xi’s main priority is maintaining his control and the Chinese Communist Party’s monopoly on power. He is all too happy to claim that the Chinese government is outperforming America’s dysfunctional system. But it is simply not the case that he thinks these goals require Beijing to actively spread authoritarianism with Chinese characteristics abroad. And China’s wealth and power, not to mention its social stability, depend on competing effectively within the interdependent global economic system, not toppling it.

Another flaw in the Biden administration’s approach is the presumption that all democracies think alike based on their shared commitment to democratic values. If only it were that simple. Values do shape a nation’s foreign policy, but history, geography, culture, political ideology and material interests also matter. It is precisely for these reasons that America’s democratic allies and partners do not see eye to eye on how to deal with China or Russia — and why they shouldn’t be forced to choose sides between the United States and the authoritarians.

#### US backsliding thumps

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There’s also the politically inconvenient question of whether the United States is best positioned to lead this effort. Rarely has America’s democracy crusade abroad contrasted more with its commitment to democratic practices at home — where the threats include Trump’s false claims that the presidential election was “stolen,” an insurrection to stop a democratic transition and efforts to restrict voting rights. America has a glass-house problem, and it needs to promote its democratic virtues with considerable humility. According to Freedom House’s annual country-by-country assessment of political and civil rights, the United States continued to experience erosion in democratic practices in 2020;over the past decade, America’s score dropped from 94 to 83 out of 100, among the steepest falls of any country during this period.

It is hard to take seriously the notion that the United States can restore its “soft power” by virtue of the example it is setting at home. A recent Pew Research Center study found that a median of only 17 percent of people in surveyed countries thought U.S. democracy worth emulating, while 23 percent said it had never offered a good example. It is also hard to quibble with the proposition that America’s influence abroad is waning primarily because of its domestic problems, rather than authoritarian muscle-flexing in Moscow or Beijing.

### AT: Demo ! – DPT

#### No impact to democracy – confounding variables control

Doorenspleet ’19 [Renske; 2019; Political Science and International Studies Professor at Warwick University; Rethinking the Value of Democracy: A Comparative Perspective, “Democracy and Interstate War,” Ch. 3]

This finding or ‘law’ has not only been recognized by scholars of international relations, but also found its way outside academia and has influenced foreign policies to promote peace and democracy, most prominently since the 1990s. However, my book will not draw conclusions based on ‘cherry-picking’ of specific studies showing how peaceful democracies are, but on a systematic overview of studies in this field. Therefore, this book relies on my own database with hundreds of different studies, which are relevant for each chapter; the articles had to engage directly with the chapter’s main research question. The next section will provide more detailed information around the selection criteria. This overview includes both highly cited and recent articles which were selected in a systematic way.

Based on analyses of statistical studies around this topic of democracy and war, it will become clear that the overall statistical support for the democratic peace hypothesis is not strong at all. In the rest of the chapter, I will spell out four reasons why democracy does not cause peace, and why the empirical support for the popular idea of democratic peace is quite weak: (1) most studies do not find a strong correlation between democracy and interstate war at the dyadic level, and they show that there are other—more powerful—explanations for war and peace, or even that the impact of democracy is a spurious one, (2) the theoretical foundation of the democratic peace hypothesis is weak, and the causal mechanisms are unclear, (3) democracies are not necessarily more peaceful in general, and the evidence for the democratic peace hypothesis at the monadic level is inconclusive, and (4) the process of democratization is dangerous and living in a democratizing country means living in a less peaceful country.

In my view, it is difficult—if not impossible—to support the democratic peace hypothesis without any reservations. The key caveats should not be ignored and certainly deserve more attention before we can confidently argue that democracies are more peaceful than other types of political systems. Please notice that I can already reveal that the assumed link between democracy and intrastate war is problematic as well, but this topic will be at the core of the next chapter (Chapter 4).

Selection of Articles: Democracy and War

The instrumental value of democracy cannot convincingly be found in democracy’s expected bond with peace. I have come to this conclusion on the basis of an analysis of statistical studies, which will be discussed in the rest of this chapter. So how did I select the articles for my database?4

For this chapter and Chapter 4, I selected the articles that focused on war and democracy. Using the online database Web of Science (formerly known as Web of Knowledge), I identified a total of almost 8000 articles published in the sampled journals until the end of 2015. I identifed them by entering ‘democr\*’ in the basic search field; this asterisk (\*)-based ‘wildcard’ allows searching for terms including ‘democratic’, ‘democracy’, and ‘democratization’ (in both British and American spellings) simultaneously, in the title, abstract and/or the keywords. As a next step, I excluded articles in which ‘democracy’ is used as synonym for state (e.g. analysis of the relationship between immigration policies and unemployment in European democracies) or a specific political party or movement (e.g. the ‘Democrats’ in the USA, or Uganda’s People’s Democratic Army) or a specifc country (e.g. the Democratic Republic of Congo). In addition, I identified them by entering ‘war\*’ in the basic search feld. The words democracy (democr\*) and war (war\*) need to be mentioned in title and/or abstract—and I also checked for equivalents of ‘war’ like ‘conflict’ and ‘dispute’ and ‘no peace’.5

As it is not feasible to analyse thousands of articles, it is necessary to take a next step in the selection process. I decided to select these articles, which will be part of the database for the third and fourth chapter, in three different ways. The first method is to choose the articles with the most citations. So, for example, in Chapter 3, the articles which are cited more than a hundred times are included in this first list. The article by Beck et al. (1998) has been cited more than 951 times, and as a consequence, this article is part of the database. But also articles with a much lower number of citations (such as Barbieri 1996, with 179 citations) are included in my analyses.

The second method is simply to include the most recent articles published in the past five years, so since beginning 2011 until end 2015. The most recent articles can easily be overlooked by applying the first method of most quoted articles. In my view, however, they still need to be included as they present the most recent findings and engage with the recent and innovative debates, which cannot be ignored in this book. For example, recent studies on democracy and interstate war (Chapter 3) have paid more attention to the mechanisms (see, e.g., Zeigler et al. 2014), and there is a growing attention for the impact of political institutions in recent studies on democracy and intrastate war (Chapter 4; see, e.g., Walter 2015). Those recent findings cannot be ignored in any systematic analysis of statistical studies on this theme.

The third method is the most subjective approach of selecting articles, as it is based on the ‘snowballing method’. So it includes articles which have not been selected by the first and second methods, but which have been quoted extensively and regularly by the previously selected articles. For example, the article by Bethany Lacina (2006) cannot be selected based on having high citations (the first method) and it cannot be included based on being a recent publication (the second method), but it has been mentioned by key studies and hence surfaces via the snowballing method (a third method). This article is important as it clearly distinguishes the determinants of conflict severity from those for conflict onset, and those determinants seem to be quite different, which is crucial information for Chapter 4.

In this way, my study presents and assesses the findings based on a big pool of statistical studies in the published literature. Based on this assessment, I will be able to draw clearer conclusions concerning the significance of the effects of democracy on interstate war (this chapter) and intrastate war (the next chapter). The Appendix shows more detailed information of the selected articles.

The Democratic Peace Hypothesis, Its Roots and Supporters

The democratic peace hypothesis6 states that democracies never or seldom go to war with one another. Where is this powerful idea of ‘democratic peace’ coming from? Before discussing the main findings of the statistical articles and before describing the four caveats of the ‘democratic peace paradigm’, we need to know a bit more around the background and the roots of this idea.

Immanuel Kant’s 1795 essay Perpetual Peace has often been mentioned as the foundation for this hypothesis. Kant believed peace was difficult to achieve, since ‘the natural state is one of war’ (Kant 1795: 10). A state of peace must therefore be established for—in his view—it is certain that hostilities will be committed and people need to be protected from each other. In such a world, each may treat his neighbour, from whom he demands security, as an enemy. In a dictatorship where ‘the subjects are not citizens, a declaration of war is the easiest thing in the world to decide upon, because war does not require of the ruler, who is the proprietor and not a member of the state, the least sacrifice of the pleasures of his table, the chase, his country houses, his court functions, and the like. He may, therefore, resolve on war as on a pleasure party for the most trivial reasons, and with perfect indifference leave the justification which decency requires to the diplomatic corps who are ever ready to provide it’ (Kant 1795: 13).

In contrast, the situation is different in constitutional republics, according to Kant. He argued that the majority of the people in republics would never vote to go to war, except for pure self-defence. Therefore, a world with only republics would be peaceful, since there would be no aggressors. The republican constitution, which requires the consent of the citizens to start a war, gives the positive prospect of perpetual peace.

It is important to note that the ideas of Kant on the one hand and the modern democratic peace scholars on the other hand are not completely similar. For example, Kant talked about republics instead of democratic states as the ideal states to achieve peace. He defined republican states as states with representative governments, in which the legislature is separated from the executive. Not surprisingly—considering the epoch in which he lived—Kant did not include universal suffrage in his definition, which is now seen as an essential dimension of democracy, even of the most minimalist types of democracy (Dahl 1971; see also Chapter 2). Moreover, Kant argued that republics will be at peace in general, which means that such political systems are expected to be not only in peace with each other, but also with other non-republican systems. Nowadays, only few scholars would support this approach of a ‘monadic democratic peace’. As will become clear at the end of this chapter, there is not much evidence for the idea that democracies are more peaceful in general.

Since the 1960s, most statistical studies have not focused on the ‘monadic democratic peace hypothesis’ but on testing the ‘dyadic democratic peace hypothesis’. This dyadic hypothesis states that it is less likely that democracies fight with each other, compared to other ‘dyads’ or other pairs of different types of political systems. The sociologist Dean Babst was the first scholar who started to build on Kant’s old idea in the ‘dyadic’ way, and decided to test it in statistical studies (Babst 1964, 1972). He concluded that ‘no wars have been fought between independent nations with elective governments between 1789 and 1941’ (Babst 1972: 55). His study was not published in one of the journals in the field of international relations, but in a sociological journal and later in Industrial Research. Therefore, it was not read by international relations scholars, and initially, it did not get the attention it deserved in the field of international politics.

Babst’s work was, for example, not cited by Melvin Small and J. David Singer (1976), and their fndings seemed to contradict Babst’s study. However, Small and Singer did not compare the rates of war proneness for democracies and dictatorships, but instead they focused on the question whether wars involving democratic states have historically been significantly different in length or in degree of violence compared to wars involving only dictatorships. For length and degree of violence during the wars, they did not find a difference between democracies and dictatorships, so they concluded that types of political systems did not matter.7 A few years later, Rudolph J. Rummel did cite Babst’s work and replicated Babst’s idea in statistical tests, which were described in the fourth book of his five-volume Understanding Confict and War (1975– 1981). He found clear support for his eleventh (of the 33) propositions about causes and conditions of conflict, which stated that ‘Libertarian systems mutually preclude violence’ (Rummel 1979: 279).

Eventually, those innovative studies from the 1970s helped to evoke the interest in the democratic peace proposition, and in the expected peaceful nature of relationships among democratic states. Since the 1980s, the number of quantitative studies has increased considerably, accumulating into an impressive field of research in international relations with its own ‘empirical law’ of democratic peace (Levy 1989: 270; see also Ray 1998).

This democratic peace hypothesis has not only received support from political scientists, but also from politicians and policy makers. Particularly since 1993, the idea of a democratic peace has inspired American foreign policies aimed at the promotion of peace and democracy. As the 42nd president of the USA (1993–2001), Bill Clinton was the first politician who explicitly bridged the gap between these findings in international relations on the one hand, and his foreign policy strategy on the other hand, at least rhetorically. Anthony Lake, who was Clinton’s National Security Adviser, stated in 1993 that in order to cope with America’s foreign policy challenges, the expansion of democratic states around the world would be essential because ‘it protects our [U.S.] interests and security’ (see Henderson 2002: 20). In his 1994 State of the Union, Clinton declared that ‘Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don’t attack each other’.8 Findings from research in the field of international relations seemed to have a direct impact on policy making, and this move of the Clinton administration can be seen as ‘a textbook case of arbitrage between the ivory tower and the real world’ (Gowa 1999: 109).

Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush, went one big step further in his faith that democratic peace holds. He argued that efforts to turn Iraq into a democratic country would have positive effects on Iraqi’s neighbours. The authoritarian regimes in the region would fall as domino stones and follow the Iraqi example. They would start democratizing as soon as they could, which would then result in achieving a peaceful and stable the Middle East. The real motives for attacking Iraq may have been different, but ‘regime change’ was at the heart of Washington’s rhetoric when the USA started to bomb Baghdad in March 2003. The rhetoric of the Bush administration focused on toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime, and replacing the entire underlying dictatorial system with a democracy.

Moreover, George W. Bush used the democratic peace idea to justify the war in Iraq, declaring, ‘The reason why I’m so strong on democracy is democracies don’t go to war with each other…I’ve got great faith in democracies to promote peace. And that’s why I’m such a strong believer that the way forward in the Middle East, the broader Middle East, is to promote democracy’.9 In 2004, the 43rd President of the USA said: ‘If you think you can have peace without democracy – again - I think you’ll find that - I can only speak for myself, that I will be extremely doubtful that it will ever happen’.10 In his second inaugural address, he stated that ‘the survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world’.

Again, these are just words from speeches and can hence be seen as rhetoric to defend military intervention (cf. Jervis 2003; Kaufmann 2004; Daalder and Lindsay 2005; Owen 2005; Lieberfeld 2005; Schmidt and Williams 2008). Still, in the end, politicians have rationalized their political decisions based on one of the most powerful ideas taken from studies in the field of international relations, clearly showing the influence of this academic idea in political practice.

Hence, the field of international relations seems to have its own law: democracies rarely fight with each other. It cannot be denied that the evidence supporting the democratic peace proposition is quite diverse in character (see Ray 1998): the evidence has been epistemological (Rummel 1975), philosophical (Doyle 1986), formal (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992), historical (Weart 1994; Ray 1995; Owen 1994), experimental (Mintz and Geva 1993), anthropological (Ember et al. 1992; Crawford 1994), psychological (Kegley and Hermann 1995), economic (Brawley 1993; Weede 1996) and political (Gaubatz 1991). Still, there have been numerous critical studies (see, i.e., Hayes 2011), and the general picture is unclear. We do not yet know much about the overall findings from statistical studies.

So far, it seems as if some quantitative studies—mainly within the field of international relations—have found strong and robust evidence which supports the ‘democratic peace hypothesis’. Those studies show that democracy has had a positive influence on international peace (see, i.e., Rummel 1979; Ray and Russett 1996). In this sense, the idea of a democratic peace seems to be confirmed. Political scientists such as James Lee Ray are passionate supporters: ‘No scientific evidence is entirely definitive’ but ‘based on all the empirical evidence so far’ the more defensible of the two possible definitive answers to the question “Does democracy cause peace?” is “Yes” (Ray 1998: 43). However, based on my own analyses of the empirical studies with statistical evidence, I cannot be as enthusiastic as those scholars; to the contrary, I whole-heartily disagree with them, as a more systematic analysis of the articles shows that there are four important weaknesses, which seriously undermines the idea that peace is one of democracy’s instrumental values.

Caveat 1: It’s Not (Just) Democracy

While analysing the selected articles, the first remarkable finding is that only a relatively small number of studies have actually tested the democratic peace hypothesis. Most of the studies have focused on the mechanisms (see next section, caveat 2), and hence seem to assume that there is a correlation between democracy and war. In this way, the majority of the studies—often unintentionally—reinforce the idea that democratic peace actually exists without testing this proposition. However, none of the studies that directly test the democratic peace hypothesis found strong evidence that democracy is the most important factor when explaining interstate war. All democratic peace studies have controlled for many possible alternative causes of the peace, such as economic development and growth, geographic distance and contiguity, power status, alliance ties, militarization and political stability. The findings show that it is not just democracy which explains war, not at all. Within this group of studies, which explicitly test the democratic peace hypothesis, four different types of findings can be detected. I will discuss those results more in-depth in the rest of this section.

First Result: There Is Correlation, but Other Explanations Are Significant Too

The first subgroup consists of scholars who stress the importance of democratic peace, despite the fact their own analyses have shown that other factors are statistically significant as well (Maoz and Russett 1993; Rousseau et al. 1996; Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Beck et al. 1998; Ray 2013). For example, some studies (e.g. Rousseau et al. 1996) included alternative independent variables in order to test realist arguments. They tested whether the distribution of power determines decisions to use force, and measures each state’s military capabilities relative to its opponent. A state’s military capability is the average of three elements: number of troops, military expenditures and military expenditures per soldier. They found that this realist variable was strong, positive and statistically significant at the 0.001 level in their analyses (see, e.g., Rousseau et al. 1996: 522, Table 2). However, not only a state’s military capabilities appeared to be an important explanation for peace. In addition, wealth, growth, alliances and contiguity played a crucial role when explaining interstate war (see, e.g., Maoz and Russett 1993: 632, Table 1).11 Moreover, when other factors are included, the impact of democracy on the likelihood of international crises is even spurious (Maoz and Russett 1993: 632; Henderson 2002: 141, see also p. 3).12 Still, scholars in this group keep defending the democratic peace idea, despite the fact that their own analyses showed the significance of alternative explanations.

Second Result: Initially There Is Correlation, but the Impact of Democracy Is Spurious When Other Explanatory Factors Are Included in the Models

The second subgroup of scholars is far more radical. Based on their own analyses, this group concludes that the democratic peace link is a spurious one (Weede 1984, 1996; Barbieri 1996; Mousseau 2013; Gartzke and Weisiger 2014).13 Typically, efforts to demonstrate the spuriousness of the statistical democratic peace pointed to other factors that, when accounted for ‘properly’, eliminated or dramatically reduced the statistical significance of shared democracy. Hence, the studies in this second group did not find strong evidence for the democratic peace hypothesis anymore, once other explanatory factors were included in the models.14

One of the most convincing alternative explanations of peace between countries is that there is no democratic peace, but a capitalist peace instead. The settlement in Germany and Japan succeeded because of the establishment of capitalist peace. Because of economic support by the Americans, who encouraged free trade and offered trade opportunities in practice as well, the poorer economies in Europe and Japan would gain economically, resulting in ‘economic growth, prosperity, and, ultimately, free trade among most of the more technologically advanced economies’ (Rasler and Thompson 2005: 232). By establishing and expanding free trade, the incentives for war would quickly decrease among trading states, according to this approach. To prevent new interstate wars after World War II, the capitalist peace was a far more important factor than the American promotion of democracy and its political institutions.

The capitalist peace, or capitalist peace theory, also states that economic development accounts for both democracy and the peace among democratic nations. Economic development is a key factor to explain democracy (Lipset 1959; see also Hegre 2003; Weede 2004).15 Moreover, economic development also plays a role when explaining peace, and the presence of market-oriented economies in countries have a positive impact on both democracy in those countries and peace between them (Mousseau 2000, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2013; see also Hegre 2014). Democratic peace only exists when both democracies have high levels of economic development, when economic development is well above the global median.

In fact, the poorest 21% of the democracies studied, and the poorest 4–5% of current democracies, are significantly more likely than other kinds of political systems to fight each other (see, e.g., Mousseau 2005). Moreover, if at least one of the democracies involved has a very low level of economic development, then democracy cannot prevent war.16 Still, there is a pacifying effect of free trade and economic interdependence, which is more important than the effect of democracy, because the former affects peace both directly and indirectly, by producing economic development and ultimately, democracy (see Weede 2004).17

Capitalist peace is not the only alternative explanation. Shared interests in general, and political similarities in specific, can also be seen as an important second alternative explanation for war and peace between countries (Farber and Gowa 1995, 1997; Gartzke 2007; Gowa 1999; Henderson 2002). Democracies are not peaceful to each other because they are democratic, but rather because they are similar. So the difference of the scores of both countries also contributes to the conflict proneness of the dyad. If the difference in levels of democracy is big, then the chance of conflict is higher (cf. Oneal and Russett 1997: 281–282).

Many researchers have conflated both the conflict-dampening impact of joined democracy and the confict-exacerbating impact of political distance in the variables focusing on political systems, but as Errol A. Henderson (2002: 32) convincingly argued: ‘Fusing these two contrasting attributes in a single variable makes it difficult to distinguish between the competing processes’. Therefore, it is better to include an additional variable of ‘political dissimilarity’ in the model. Henderson (2002) was one of the first scholars who included this variable and measured it by taking the absolute value of the difference between the two states’ scores. His main variables were not only political similarity, but also geographic distance and economic interdependence, and he concluded that democratic peace is a statistical artefact which disappears when those other variables are taken into account. Political similarity clearly has a pacifying effect18 (see Werner 2000; Henderson 2002; Beck et al. 2004), and it is not democracy per se which is the decisive factor.19

Hence, the benefits of trade and trade interdependence are essential explanations, while democracy is spurious or at least subordinate (see also Rosecrance 1986; Weede 1984, 1996; Hegre 2000, 2014; Jervis 2002; Souva 2003; Rasler and Thompson 2005: 235; Mousseau 2000, 2002, 2003, 2005). Based on those studies, it is safe to conclude that democracy, on its own, is an unlikely cause of the democratic peace.

Third Result: There Is Correlation, but Other Explanations Are Much Stronger

This same point that democracy is just one of the explanations for peace (and not even a very important one) is also at the core of studies in the third subgroup. Scholars of this group keep arguing that there is support for the democratic peace hypothesis, and that the link is not spurious. In this sense, they are less radical than the second group of scholars, as they do not completely reject the value of democracy for peace. On the other hand, their own analyses have clearly shown that alternative factors—hence other factors than democracy or type of political system— are not only statistically significant but also more important when trying to explain interstate war (Bremer 1992; Gelpi 1997; Oneal and Russett 1999a, b; Reiter and Stam 2002; Peterson 2013; Caselli et al. 2015).

Theoretical arguments and empirical evidence suggest that democracy is not the most important factor, while war is more likely to occur between states that are geographically proximate, approximately equal in power, major powers, allied, economically advanced and highly militarized than between those that are not. Bivariate analyses of these factors in relation to the onset of interstate war over all pairs of states in the period from 1816 to 1965 have generally supported these associations. However, multivariate analyses revealed some differences. Stuart Bremer (1992), for example, showed that some factors are far more important than others. The existence of a dangerous, war-prone dyad can be best explained by the presence of contiguity, the absence of an alliance and the absence of more advanced economy. The absence of democratic polity and other factors (absence of overwhelming preponderance, and presence of major power) are less powerful. Overall, these findings suggest that our research priorities may be seriously distorted and that we should not focus too much on the perceived positive impact of democracy, but on other factors (such as alliances and economic factors) instead.

Fourth Result: There Is Correlation, but Only Under Certain Specific Conditions

The final subgroup of scholars argues that we cannot unconditionally accept the idea that democratic peace exists in general, so always and everywhere. Their statistical studies clearly showed that support for this hypothesis heavily depends on other factors. The chance of democratic peace depends not just on the specific historical period (Cold War or not; Gibler and Sarkees 2004; Siverson and Emmons 1991; Weede 1984), but also the stage of the conflict (beginning, duration or severity; see Bremer 1993; Bennett and Stam 1996; Reed 2000), and on the neighbourhood instability (extent of confict in the region; see Gibler and Braithwaite 2013; Gibler and Miller 2013). Despite the differences between the studies, there is one common finding in all studies: when explaining interstate war, we cannot just rely on the impact of democracy, as it is too much dependent on other factors.

Several scholars found strong evidence for the idea that democratic peace exists, but only during some specific historical periods. Based on this evidence, they concluded that democratic peace is simply a statistical artefact of the Cold War. For example, Henry Farber and Joanne Gowa (1995) found statistical support for the idea that peace between democracies is an artefact of the Cold War, when the threat from the communist states forced democracies to ally with one another (see also Mearsheimer 1990). Sebastian Rosato (2003) also argued that most of the significant evidence for democratic peace has been observed after World War II; and that it has happened within a broad alliance, which can be identified with NATO and its satellite nations, imposed and maintained by American dominance.

Since the Second World War, war has become a very costly affair. Scholars discovered that only a handful of states are ‘capable of engaging in major power warfare. That process of elimination has not yet extinguished the possibility of major power warfare, but it has lowered its probability immensely’ (Rasler and Thompson 2005: 219). The chance to achieve something in a war is low in general, and even lower in a bipolar world with two big power players risking high nuclear war costs (Jervis 2002). While war became more costly, trade became less costly; as a consequence, the war/trade costs increased during the Cold War (Rosecrance 1986; see also Jervis 2002). In such a world, war and conflict have become less attractive, while trade and cooperation have become more appealing (Rasler and Thompson 2005: 219). Hence, more states decided to adopt trading strategies in order to prevent confict and war as much as possible. In the end, democracy was part of the story, but only a very small part with a subordinated role next to the power dynamics during the Cold War, the costs of warfare and the benefits of trade.

Some scholars found evidence that the democratic peace still exists in the post-Cold War period (Park 2013) which weakens this argument. However, most analyses showed that dyadic dispute rates have converged after the Cold War (see, e.g., Gowa 2011). Moreover, jointly democratic dyads are likely to be allied only after 1945 (see Gibler and Sarkees 2004); during the 1816–1944 time period, there is even a negative relationship between democratic dyads and alliance formation.20 These findings cast serious doubts on the idea of a general existence of democratic peace.

Not only the historical period, but also the *stage* of the conflict is crucial. Some scholars in this group provided evidence that democratic peace is not universal, but that it depends on the stage and whether we focus on the beginning, duration or severity of the conflict. Although joint democracy has some pacifying effects on the onset of conflict, the results suggest that they are unrelated to the escalation of disputes to war (see Reed 2000). Moreover, democratic peace is dependent on the neighbourhood instability. Democracies often have few territorial issues over which to contend, as they tend to be part of a stable region. Democracies only seldom have territorial disputes with their neighbours, and therefore they can more easily choose favourable conflicts to escalate. The type of political system does not predict conflict selection or victory once controls are added for issue salience (Gibler and Miller 2013; see also Park and James 2015). There is an interaction between joint democracy and regional instability, which confirms the idea that the effects of type of political system on continued conflict apply mostly to dyads in peaceful regions (Gibler and Braithwaite 2013; see also Park and James 2015). Very democratic countries might even become more aggressive and faster than other political systems, once the region becomes more hostile (see, e.g., Baliga et al. 2011).

The General Lesson from the Results in a Nutshell (Caveat 1)

In short, regardless of the differences between the statistical studies on democratic peace, all findings have indicated that other explanations are important as well. It is clear that democracy is just one of the explanations, and certainly not the most important one,21 sometimes even spurious and often heavily dependent on other factors. It is not (just) democracy to be preoccupied with, when trying to prevent war between countries (Table 3.1).

Caveat 2: What Are the Causal Mechanisms?

Most of the statistical studies on democratic peace seem to assume that there is a correlation between democracy and war; based on this assumption, they then decide to focus on the mechanisms. This is problematic as none of the democratic peace studies found strong evidence that democracy is the most important factor when explaining interstate war (see the previous section). As a consequence, the next step of looking for mechanisms is quite irrelevant and not necessary in my view, but most studies nevertheless argue that the field lacks strong theoretical foundations and robust empirical evidence that can reveal convincing causal mechanisms.22 Those studies seem to accept the correlation between dyadic democracy and peace, and then start questioning whether democracy really causes peace before investigating potential mechanisms.

Table 3.1 Statistical studies on democracy and interstate war (dyadic level)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Caveat 1: It’s Not (Just) Democracy | Studies |
| ‘It’s just democracy; democracy is most important explanation for peace between countries’ | No studies found |
| ‘There is correlation, but other explanations are significant too’ | Beck et al. (1998), Gleditsch and Hegre (1997), Maoz and Russett (1993), Ray (2013), and Rousseau et al. (1996) |
| ‘Initially there is correlation, but the impact of democracy is spurious when other explanatory factors are included in the models’ | Barbieri (1996), Beck et al. (2004), Farber and Gowa (1997), Gartzke (2007), Gartzke and Weisiger (2014), Gowa (1999), Hegre (2000, 2003, 2014, Jervis (2002), Mousseau (2000, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2013), Oneal and Russett (1997), Rasler and Thompson (2005), Rosecrance (1986), Souva (2003), Weede (1984, 2004), and Werner (2000) |
| ‘There is correlation, but other explanations are much stronger’ | Bremer (1992), Caselli et al. (2015), Gelpi (1997), Oneal and Russett (1999a, b), and Peterson (2013) |
| ‘There is correlation, but only under certain specific conditions’ | Baliga et al. (2011), Bremer (1993), Bennett and Stam (1996), Farber and Gowa (1995), Gibler and Braithwaite (2013), Gibler and Miller (2013), Gibler and Sarkees (2004), Gowa (2011), Jervis (2002), Mearsheimer (1990), Park (2013), Park and James (2015), Rasler and Thompson (2005), Reed (2000), Rosato (2003), Rosecrance (1986), Gibler and Sarkees (2004), Siverson and Emmons (1991), and Weede (1984) |

### AT: Demo ! – Collective Action

#### Democracy fails to overcome collective action problems – populism and other self-defeating aspects are endemic, NOT backsliding

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VI. THE INTERLOCKING CRISES

In this Part, we highlight how the vulnerabilities of democracy are made salient as well as exacerbated by climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene. We also emphasize how climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene place democracies that attempt to navigate them in a particularly impervious Scylla and Charybdis-like situation.173 The Scylla is ineffective policy; the Charybdis is some relaxation of the core democratic principle of popular sovereignty. Both options seem nearly guaranteed to trigger significant legitimacy challenges to liberal democratic systems.

Traditionally, two important sources of democratic legitimacy have been beneficial consequences, in the utilitarian tradition, and consent, in the social contract tradition.174 Whatever else may count as beneficial consequences, the capacity to solve problems that threaten the physical and social security of citizens is a central and important source of democratic legitimacy.175 Call this the “public utility” view of democratic legitimacy. And whatever else may count as consent, surely the fact that the majority of citizens have expressed their preference for a certain candidate, law, or policy is an important source of democratic legitimacy as well.176 Call this the “expressed preference” view of democratic legitimacy.

Consider public utility first. As we have pointed out, most contemporary democracies have thus far failed to address the emerging problems of the Anthropocene.177 Consequently, the sense of physical and social insecurity grows more acute amongst citizens as the problems mount and compound.178 The legitimacy of these democracies, and the supranational institutions they have created, such as the European Union and the United Nations, is thus compromised on public utility grounds.

Now consider expressed preference. The global scope, long-term reach, unprecedented features, and highly complex nature of climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene require democracies to make robust commitments to multilateral cooperation, long-term planning, significant deviations from the status quo, and increased reliance on expert knowledge if they are to succeed in managing these problems. 179 Citizens’ expressed preferences may be quite distant from this network of commitments and activities,180 since the benefits of successfully managing a problem like climate change would mostly accrue not to these citizens, but to spatiotemporally distant people (i.e., the global poor and future generations) and genetically distant (non-human) nature. 181 Attempting to force such commitments, especially at a time when democracies are already being accused of not being responsive enough to their citizens, can further compromise legitimacy.182

We thus face an apparent dilemma: if democracies fail to successfully address climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene, their legitimacy will be challenged on public utility grounds. If they aggressively attempt to address them, their legitimacy will likely be challenged on expressed preference grounds. Either way, we can expect the power of populist figures and movements to grow.

The remainder of this Part illuminates this dilemma by discussing how climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene interact with some further democratic vulnerabilities: weak multilateralism, short-termism, the profusion of veto players, the contested role of experts, and self-referring decision making.

A. Weak Multilateralism

Climate change cannot be successfully managed without a strong commitment to international cooperation.183 For a climate regime to succeed, it must be effective, perceived as at least not unfair by all parties, and otherwise acceptable to each party.184 At various times, the attempt to create a regime has foundered on each of these three considerations.185

From the beginning of the negotiations that led to the adoption of the FCCC in 1992 and in subsequent negotiations under the Convention, the question of fairness has been unavoidable.186 When agreements have been structured in ways that are acceptable to developing countries (e.g., the Kyoto Protocol) they have been perceived as unfair by the United States.187 This has led to the weakening of commitments and to a regime whose effectiveness is in question.188 The Paris Agreement, by putting voluntary pledges at the center, was designed to avoid the problem of perceived unfairness.189 It was reasonably thought that no party could say that they had been unfairly treated when they have agreed to be measured in relation to a commitment that they have voluntarily undertaken and to which no sanctions are attached for non-compliance. 190 Nevertheless, that was exactly the claim made by President Trump in announcing his intention to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement.191 Moreover, the cost of creating an agreement to which no one could reasonably object was to create an Agreement whose effectiveness was in question even before the United States announced its intention to withdraw.192

While climate change is its own “full tragedy and weird comedy,” 193 there are structural issues at work.194 As the world order attempts to adjust to shifting power distributions following the emergence of new giants such as China and India, when it comes to problems such as climate change the cooperation of such countries is no longer just desirable but essential.195 As their collaboration becomes more valuable, the price for obtaining it rises accordingly.196 This complicates negotiations, and the problem seems only destined to worsen because this logic applies not only to presently emerging world powers, but also to those that have already emerged and those that will emerge in the future. As we observed in an earlier paper, “[g]lobal governance in the Anthropocene is cooperation-hungry, and this increases the price of obtaining cooperation from every country.”197

In addition, democracies have their own particular problems when it comes to multilateral agreements. Except in the rare case where they are able to steer multilateral agreements in the way they prefer, democratic governments “often seek to avoid compliance with binding multilateral decisions if this weakens their relationship to their electorate.”198 This is in fact what happened in the case of President Trump’s repudiation of the Paris Agreement.199 The stated reason was the agreement’s unfairness to the United States.200 However, the deeper reason was that the Obama administration’s decision to join, although admittedly an act of national self-determination, was not in fact an authentic deliverance of American popular sovereignty, at least in the eyes of Trump and his supporters.201 According to Trump,

[t]he Paris Climate Accord is simply the latest example of Washington entering into an agreement that disadvantages the United States to the exclusive benefit of other countries, leaving American workers – who [sic] I love – and taxpayers to absorb the cost in terms of lost jobs, lower wages, shuttered factories, and vastly diminished economic production.202

In the same speech Trump reminded his audience that “I was elected to represent the citizens of Pittsburgh, not Paris.”203

In democracies, it is ultimately citizens who empower their representatives to bargain and strike terms of international cooperation.204 Successfully addressing the problems of the Anthropocene is likely to require unprecedented levels of multilateralism.205 Democratic states that attempt to rise to the challenge are likely to face legitimacy challenges on expressed preference grounds. Those that do not may face legitimacy challenges on public utility grounds.

B. Short-termism

Short-termism can be defined as “the priority given to present net benefits at the cost of future ones.”206 Short-termism is a problem whenever policy domains have an extended timeframe, as is the case with climate change and other systemic problems of the Anthropocene.207 In these cases, present net benefits may need to be curtailed (through increases in taxes and regulations, for example) for the sake of benefits that might materialize in the distant future. These future benefits will then mostly advantage people other than those who have borne the costs. Reasons for privileging the present in these cases include pure time preference, uncertainty, and diminished or even null moral concern for those who might benefit in the future.208 The temptation, then, is to eschew the costs of the required policies and “pass the buck” to future generations.209

Short-termism is not always irrational nor morally wrong.210 It has been argued, however, that short-termism is both irrational and morally wrong in the case of climate change.211 The sources of short-termism are rooted in human psychology and can manifest in any kind of political regime.212 However, it has been argued that democracies are particularly vulnerable to short-termism.213

One important reason for the short-termism of democratic political regimes is that these regimes inherit, via voting and other forms of popular influence, their citizens’ biases in favor of the present. Policies may also reflect citizens’ misinformation about, or unawareness of, long-term processes, risks, policy aims, and possible outcomes.214 To counter these tendencies, liberal democracies typically filter their citizens’ inter-temporal biases, misinformation, and unawareness through such mechanisms as constitutions and reliance on expert bodies.215 Yet the more filtering they do, the more likely they are to incur legitimacy challenges on expressed preference grounds.216 This is a problem of intra-generational legitimacy.217

There are also problems of inter-generational legitimacy.218 There is no guarantee that long-term policies, if enacted, will achieve the anticipated aims, or that they will indeed make future people better off by achieving these aims.219 If things do not work out, these policies might be deemed illegitimate on public utility grounds by the very future people that they were supposed to benefit.220 In addition, such policies may be deemed illegitimate by future people on expressed preference grounds.221 Legitimacy on expressed preference grounds typically requires some form of authorization by those who are affected by policies, yet future people who will be affected by past policies never authorize them, nor can they hold anyone accountable.222

Another reason for democracies’ short-termism is the scheduling of participatory events.223 Democracy requires elections, which must be relatively frequent in order to ensure that people can regularly express their will, vote out politicians who are judged to have failed in some important ways, and prevent rent-seeking behavior by not giving politicians enough time to set up camp within institutions.224 However, the relatively short duration of electoral cycles ensures that politicians are constantly concerned with their own reelection, and this may prevent them from taking hard policy decisions that require a great deal of political capital and do not produce appreciable outcomes in time for the next election.225 Because most of the impacts of climate change will largely materialize in the future and be felt by future generations, efforts at their alleviation must obey a clock that is not in sync with the electoral clock.

Note that there is no need to assume that politicians are always and necessarily motivated by only a thirst for power.226 In a democ- racy, even politicians who are exclusively motivated by the aspiration to make good long-term policy need to be elected or re-elected to do so.227 In order to be elected, they need to harness the votes of the current electorate.228 So, the problem of short-termism goes beyond a lack of conscientious far-sightedness on the side of politicians: it is structurally connected to the very fact of popular sovereignty—at least as long as the majority of people discount the future.229

C. Veto Players

Any political system (with the possible exclusion of some forms of anarchy) accords veto powers to some agent: a monarchy to the king, an aristocracy to the nobility, a technocracy to the experts, a theocracy to the religious leader, and so on.230 A veto player in a political system can be understood as an agent who can prevent a departure from the status quo.231 In democracies, veto players can be specified by constitutions (e.g., the President and the Congress in the United States), emerge from the political system (e.g., the Supreme Court in the United States, political parties that are members of a government coalition in Western Europe), or from civil society (e.g., powerful industries, unions or other interest groups in many countries).232

In a democracy, veto players can protect minority interests, prevent destabilizing change, and preserve important values and policies through periods in which they are unpopular.233 More generally, veto players prevent a democratic system from being excessively fluid and flexible.234 This is attractive when the status quo is desirable or an exogenous shock is beneficial; however, when the status quo is undesirable or an exogenous shock disturbs a desirable status quo, fluidity and flexibility are needed in order to respond quickly

and decisively.235 This is arguably the situation in the case of climate

change, which demands nimble political responses to which veto

players would have to acquiesce.

The presence of many veto players threatens to delay or even block the formulation and implementation of policy.236 Liberal democracies, with their reliance on checks and balances generated by institutional architecture or by competition among interest groups, seem particularly vulnerable to such threats—and the more veto players in a democracy the greater the degree of vulnerability.237

An especially high concentration of veto players helps to explain why a powerful, rich, technological leader like the United States is uncannily slow to address consequential public issues such as the politics of distribution, racial equality, immigration, the proper balance between liberty and national security, and of course climate change.238 The United States Constitution separates powers in the federal government, reserves a broad range of powers to states and includes a bill of rights that can be viewed as effectively giving veto powers to individuals in some circumstances. Practices have also developed through time that inhibit action, such as requiring supermajorities for some political decisions.

The profusion of veto players may be extreme in the United States, but it is a feature common to many liberal democracies that often makes political action elusive even on relatively minor policy issues.239 For every possible policy change, there is always a “do-nothing” alternative (sometimes more respectably presented as a “wait and see” alternative) that is invariably attractive to some veto player.240

“Do-nothing” alternatives may sometimes be justified on grounds of rational choice considerations relating to transition costs and uncertainty about both the process of transition and the final pay-off structure.241 Veto players give voice to such considerations, as well as other considerations that we have already noted.242 But veto players may also give voice to less rational tendencies, which are inevitably present and, in democracies, are crystallized in votes. Among these tendencies may be disproportionate attention to sunk costs, finding refuge in “what has always worked,” fear of regretting the changes made, the desire to maintain and transmit a sense of control by not acceding to the demands of new circumstances, and lack of trust in those who are proposing the changes.243

Veto players tend to slow down or block deviations from the status quo, and this makes it difficult to tackle climate change and other similar problems of the Anthropocene.244 But veto players also reflect and configure real structures of power, and protect and promote the needs and interests of actual people.245 When the number of veto players or the importance of specific veto players is altered, new power structures emerge and this can raise legitimacy challenges on both utility and expressed preference grounds.246 It is not obvious what veto players should be eliminated or demoted in order to produce more nimble and effective climate policy, and which ones should be given additional power instead. Nor is it obvious who should decide the answers to these questions (if not the people) and on what grounds (if not majority rule).

Veto players configure systems of checks and balances, filters and buffers, which are only partially exposed to popular influence.247 This anti-majoritarian service is particularly precious to liberal democracies, which rely on veto players to protect and promote the rights of individuals and minorities—and, with that, the core liberal principles of individual liberty and human rights. However, as a consequence, if a majority exists that is overwhelmingly convinced by climate science, totally in favor of leaving all remaining fossil energy sources in the ground, and ready to embark on ambitious renewable energy programs, this majority may still find it difficult to act. Liberal democracies protect minorities of various kinds in varying degrees, and these include climate change denialists and those who profit from fossil fuels. Economically powerful and en- trenched economic minorities (the “1%”) are often extremely effective veto players.248 This can prevent action that would benefit most people, thus increasing the risks of legitimacy challenges.

D. Contested Role of Experts

Climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene are unprecedented phenomena whose complexity and implications are only beginning to be understood by scientists and other experts. Climate change is a multidimensional problem that concerns and connects ecology, demography, development, production, consumption, resource use, trade rules, health, security, urban planning, mobility, migration, and more, in novel ways.249 It poses threats that are multi-scalar, probabilistic, indirect, often invisible, spatiotemporally unbound, and potentially catastrophic. These threats challenge our reason, emotions, and imagination.250 If there were ever a complex problem that required expert knowledge, it is climate change.

Liberal democracies make significant use of expert knowledge in policymaking in various ways to protect liberal values, and to boost their efficiency, equity, and political stability.251 Expert knowledge is distinguished from non-expert opinion through such criteria as experience, professional and educational qualifications, peer-review, and rules of evidence.252

Still, in a democracy, differences in expertise do not translate to differences in political authority, for much the same reason why differences in lineage do not translate in this way. A democratic citizen can recognize expertise and accept the science of, say, climate change, and still object to the expert who counsels some course of action: “You may be right, but who made you boss?”253 In a democracy, expertise is always subservient to the voice of the people (pace Plato, philosophers cannot be kings).254

For this reason, the relationships between experts and ordinary citizens are always potentially fraught in a democracy. These relationships vary from country to country, time to time, and issue to issue. Often, the relationships are placid in good times and rocky in hard times. Major policy failures, such as the global financial crisis of 2008 and the spreading of terrorist radicalization in many European Union countries, can lead citizens to question experts’ knowledge and see them as just another interest group seeking rents at people’s expense.255

In the case of climate change, an additional element makes the role of experts potentially unpopular. Climate science, in our present social context, inevitably provokes fundamental questions about how we ought to live and organize our societies, throwing doubt on the ways in which we do so now. A particularly powerful and widespread attempt to avoid cognitive dissonance through various forms of rationalization may thus come into play. After all, if something potentially catastrophic such as climate change can result from the very ways in which we live our everyday lives—how we dwell, how we eat, how we make things, how we move around—the nagging thought is that there might be something fundamentally wrong about the ways in which we live. These are not comfortable thoughts and can lead to resentment or worse towards those who bear the message.

The incipient conflict and simmering resentment has been exploited by powerful interests who look to be the immediate losers from a transition to a more sustainable way of life. They stoke the dissonance and encourage denialism. The most obvious manifestation of this is the climate change denial campaign, directed towards preventing the formation of a consensus for political action on climate change.256

The main strategy of climate change denialists has been to suppress both belief in the science and belief that there is a scientific consensus on the existence, anthropogenic nature, and dangerousness of climate change.257 In its aims and strategies, climate change denialism has replicated earlier forms of denialism involving tobacco smoking, acid rain, DDT, and ozone depletion. 258

The rhetorical techniques adopted by climate change denialism have also not been particularly original: versions of these techniques were used in all the other cases mentioned above. These techniques include attacking sources rather than discussing evidence, “moving the goalpost” by requesting ever larger amounts of evidence, submitting false evidence, suggesting false equivalences or analogies, confusing ignorance about mechanisms or processes with ignorance about facts or outcomes, cherry-picking anomalies, selective skepticism, quote mining, and the so-called “Gish gallop”—overwhelming discussants or audiences with unscientific claims to make it difficult to counter all the misinformation at once.259

What is new about denialism in the Anthropocene is not its strategies or tactics, but its amplification. Expertise denialism now travels through social media, which allows for unfiltered instant communication among citizens and between citizens and representatives. Traditional intermediaries—political parties, intellectuals, and the professional press—are increasingly made redundant by these technologies. Indeed, to maintain their relevance (and market share), these traditional intermediaries often seek to replicate the immediacy and excitement of social media, compromising their own claims to epistemological or institutional privilege.

One effect of the speed and directness with which political communication occurs through social media is an increased tendency to brand political ideas and policy proposals and to market them as products.260 The need to engage audiences with arguments and relevant facts—and even to maintain consistency in one’s opinions— decreases, while the need for a good, resonant, quick-win pitch increases. With that, the importance of expert knowledge is downplayed to the advantage of skilled branding and marketing.

Another effect of the speed and directness with which political communication occurs through social media is a polarizing fragmentation, not just at the level of policy judgments, but also regarding the sets of facts to which different individuals and groups make reference. Social media allows for networked, yet highly fragmented, political communication, making it harder to individuate and even debate a common story.261

Much empirical work in psychology, economics, political science, sociology, and communications has gone into trying to explain how and why disagreement about facts can occur.262 The explanation seems to be some sort of “biased assimilation,” whereby people adjust their view of facts with reference to their self-defining values, social identities, and partisan allegiances.263 Experiments on reception suggest that individuals selectively credit or dismiss information in a manner that reinforces beliefs congenial to their values.264 These experiments found that subjects were substantially more likely to count a scientist as an authoritative “expert” when the scientist was depicted as taking a position consistent with the subjects’ cultural predispositions, than when that scientist took a contrary position.265 Interestingly, these tendencies seem to be directly, rather than inversely, related to levels of science literacy and general education of experimental subjects: the more equipped people are to know and understand the facts, the more they disagree on them.266

In times of social media, these tendencies may be amplified, insofar as individuals tend to gravitate towards and engage mostly with resonant networks of “like-me’s” that by and large reaffirm their own values and perspectives.267 This may tribalize positions and impede constructive democratic engagement and debate from ever taking off on many contested issues. In addition, one can expect increasing polarization to also be fomented by individuals and groups trying to secure loyalty to their branded political ideas and policy proposals in this way.

The internet and other media, with their seemingly endless resources, create the impression that expertise can be picked and chosen at will, thereby feeding the perception of public life as a spectacle.268 Public discussions, unfiltered by “moderators,” unfold in a denuded space stripped of epistemological norms.269 In the United States at least, this has morphed into a generalized atmosphere of expertise denialism writ large. Denialism about evolution, vaccines, economics, and more has become commonplace.270

It is not an exaggeration to say that we are on the verge of adopting epistemological nihilism as a public epistemology.271 No commitment to facts, in the traditional sense, or even consistency of opinion, is required.272 Truth is what the speaker says it is, here and now. In a moment it may be different, depending on what the speaker can get away with. In a democracy, it is up to elections or approval ratings to resolve disagreements. It is a short step from here to other exercises of power.

The nihilistic turn in public epistemology threatens the legitimacy of democracy, for democracy cannot solve the problems it faces without mobilizing epistemological authority that is itself hostage to popular vote. As difficult as this challenge may be in favorable times, it is greatly magnified in the face of climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene.

E. Self-referring Decision-making

What we have elsewhere called the “agency presupposition” is deeply entrenched in modern democratic theory. This presupposition holds “that the political community is constituted by agents who initiate and conduct political action, and who themselves, and their interests and welfare, are what matter politically.”273 The agency presupposition arose at a time in which democratic principles, norms and institutions were being developed to govern relations between agents who lived in close proximity to one another in space and time, and whose decisions and actions had relatively direct impacts on each other. However, around 1950, a profound change occurred from a world of discrete but interdependent states to a world of shared social space in which distant events have localized impacts and vice-versa. In this globalized world, the fates of nation-states and their peoples became not just effectively interdependent, but also structurally interconnected, with social, political, and economic activities, interactions, and infrastructures stretching beyond political frontiers, leading to a deepening enmeshment of the local and the global.274 Political decisions and actions taken locally (in selected powerful countries, many of which were democratic) now systematically had planetary implications, impacting for better or worse the welfare and interests of people in all corners of the world.

With the Anthropocene disruption of earth’s fundamental ecological systems, including those that govern climate, political agents (living humans who can initiate and conduct political action) have gained unprecedented power over a vast universe of non-agents that comprises animate and inanimate nature as well as those living on the periphery of both space and time.275 The circle of affected nonagents has expanded beyond cultural, genetic, and spatiotemporal boundaries to include virtually everything on the planet, now extended indefinitely in time.276 This establishes an enormous asymmetry of power. Those on the periphery, and nature, cannot initiate and conduct political action: they cannot reciprocate, they cannot participate, they cannot protest, they cannot retaliate.277 In democratic terms, they do not matter—or only matter derivatively, if political agents care about their fate. And it is as undemocratic as can be, particularly if the democracy in question is a liberal democracy, to force political agents to care if they do not.278

A phenomenon like climate change creates ubiquitous tensions and trade-offs between agents and non-agents—those who are governed, and those who are affected.279 The latter will suffer most from climate change, but a democracy responsive to the claims of future generations (or those living beyond its borders, or nonhuman nature) may often have to forgo opportunities for bringing beneficial consequences to those who empower it with their votes.280 Instead, democratic leaders would have to enact policies favoring the interests of those who do not vote because they do not yet exist (or live in different countries or are not human).

Democracies making policies that favor non-agents will expose themselves to intra-generational legitimacy challenges on both public utility grounds and expressed preference grounds.281 Even if the expected benefits to non-agents were great, such non-agent-oriented policies might not win the hearts, minds, and guts of living human agents who may express their preference for themselves instead— particularly in democracies that are already being accused of not being responsive enough to their citizens.282 Many believe that ignoring or heavily discounting the welfare and interests of non-agents is morally wrong, but if expressed preference is important, it may be a wrong that democracies cannot avoid committing.283

The agency presupposition makes government responsive to those who are governed but not to those who are affected beyond borders in space, time, citizenship, or genetic make-up. A basic presupposition of liberal democracy appears to be threatened by the very actions that would have to be taken to express concern for all those affected by the climate-changing and eco-altering actions of its citizens.

VII. CONCLUSION

We began this Article by explaining the notion of the Anthropocene and briefly telling the story of failed responses to climate change. We went on to discuss the uneasy relationship between climate change and democracy, focusing on liberal democracy in particular. We presented some basic aspects of democratic theory and practice, and discussed some of democracy’s main vulnerabilities. We showed how in the Anthropocene these vulnerabilities can magnify, leading to legitimacy challenges.

These legitimacy challenges are not new. Democracy has always been haunted by anxiety about its future. Some political theorists have argued that democracy is the only form of political organization that underwrites the seeds of its own destruction.284 Demagogues and extremists who wish to blow up the state are allowed the same freedoms as those who seek to manage it more fairly and effectively. The risk of a democratically enabled democide is not an abstract or counterfactual risk: the executioners of German democracy came to power through the rules and procedures of the Weimar Republic.285 If we open our eyes, we may see these stories going on around us today.

Modern democracy is, in many respects, the most sophisticated articulation of the human capacity for social organization. It is also the most hospitable environment for the expression of human values that, through centuries of emancipatory struggles, have come to be regarded as fundamental, such as individual liberty and political equality.286 Our objective in this Article is not to write a requiem for democracy, but rather to chart the seas that democratic theory and practice will have to navigate in order to successfully address climate change and survive the challenges of the Anthropocene. We have highlighted the vulnerabilities of democracy in order to throw in sharp relief the many challenges entailed by the voyage, not to discourage it. Democracy has shown itself to be remarkably resilient in the past, and it may well succeed in rising to these challenges as well. There are those who think that democracy doesn’t stand a chance.287 But many still believe that the only solution to the problems of the Anthropocene lies in more, better, or different democracy.288 And there are those who think that even if democracy fails these challenges, democracy itself will not have failed. For they see its value as intrinsic, and not just as a means to better or more effective governance.289

It is difficult to sketch the nature of possible democratic solutions to some of the issues that we have raised, and we will not try to do so here. Instead, we will close with a summary of what seems to be the main challenge ahead. The existing democratic deficits in liberal countries will generally have to be reduced. Yet, in the case of climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene, liberal democratic countries will have to muster both the internal coherence and strength to better resist populism, and the external coherence and strength to be more cooperative partners within the framework of supranational institutions. This is necessary because, in the Anthropocene, the global spills into the domestic and vice-versa: a globally changing climate may have pernicious local impacts on the territory and population of any given country, while political dysfunction in one country can cripple [halt] efforts at global governance.

The democracies of the Anthropocene will have to work at multiple scales in both space and time, incorporating the interests of the global with those of the local, and those of the future with those of the present. This seems to suggest, perhaps paradoxically, that the democracies of the Anthropocene will have to be more democratic in some respects and less democratic in others. The relation between popular sovereignty and institutions that limit popular sovereignty while respecting it is a tug-of-war in democratic theory and practice that has been going on for millennia, and is now being put to unprecedented tests.

Liberal democracies, in particular, have an enormous amount at stake. Liberal political theory has always recognized the right to resist and even overthrow illegitimate political power.290 This right has been used to justify historical events that liberals typically applaud, including the Glorious Revolution, the French Revolution, and the American Revolution.291 Despite their failures and excesses, these revolutions forwarded liberal values and helped to entrench them in institutions. Unable to find consistent responses to challenges to their own legitimacy in the Anthropocene, liberal democracies may be in danger of warranting revolutions against themselves and the very institutions that should realize their values. They may become the ancient regime.

### AT: Terror !

#### No nuclear terror and no impact

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The likelihood that anyone outside a war zone will be killed by an Islamist extremist terrorist is extremely small. In the United States, for example, some six people have perished each year since 9/11 at the hands of such terrorists—for an annual fatality rate of about one in 50 million for the period.

This might be taken to suggest, as one writer has characterized it, that “terrorism is such a minor threat to American life and limb that it’s simply bizarre—just stupefyingly irrational and intellectually unserious—to suppose that it could even begin to justify the abolition of privacy rights as they have been traditionally understood in favour of the installation of a panoptic surveillance state.” 1 And terrorism specialist Marc Sageman characterizes the threat terrorists present in the United States as “rather negligible.” 2 The vast majority of what is commonly tallied as terrorism has occurred in war zones, and this is especially true for fatalities.3 But even this has been exaggerated by conflating terrorism with war: civil war violence that would previously have been seen to be acts of insurgency are now often labeled terrorism.4

In order to put the numbers in some context, it has often been pointed out that far more Americans are killed each year not only by such highly destructive hazards as drug overdoses or automobile accidents, but even by such comparatively minor ones as lightning, accident-causing deer, peanut allergies, or drowning in bathtubs. Some comparisons are arrayed in Table 1.

In recent years, however, critics have attacked what they call “the bathtub fallacy.” 5

First, they stress that it is important to keep in mind that bathtubs are not out to kill you while terrorism is a willful act carried out by diabolical, dedicated, and clever human beings. Thus, although the number of people Islamist terrorists have been able to kill in the West since 9/11 has thus far been quite limited, those terrorists, as they plot and plan and learn from experience, may very well become far more destructive in the future.

Second, the critics charge that the comparison of terrorism with bathtub drownings is incomplete in that it doesn’t consider the possibility that the incidence of terrorist destruction is low precisely because counterterrorism measures are so effective.

Third, it is argued that, unlike bathtub drownings, terrorism exacts costs far beyond those entailed in the event itself. It damagingly sows terror, fear, and anxiety; disturbs our

Table

Description automatically generated

psychological well-being; undermines trust and openness within the society; and reduces our sense of intrinsic moral worth even as it increases a sense of helplessness. They maintain, fourth, that the comparison is invalid because, unlike terrorism, bathtubs provide benefit.

And finally, they contend that terrorism costs are peculiarly high, particularly in a democratic society, because the fears it generates will necessarily need to be serviced by policy makers, and this pressure forces, or inspires, them to adopt countermeasures, both foreign and domestic, that are costly and sometimes even excessive.

In this article, we examine these five propositions and find all of them to be wanting. In the process, we conclude that terrorism is rare outside war zones because, to a substantial degree, terrorists don’t exist there. In general, as with rare diseases that kill few, it makes more policy sense to expend limited funds on hazards that inflict far more damage.

Terrorism is willed and may well become more destructive

Journalist Jeffrey Goldberg has suggested that “the fear of terrorism isn’t motivated solely by what terrorists have done, but what terrorists hope to do.” Bathtubs are simply not “engaged in a conspiracy with other bathtubs to murder ever-larger numbers of Americans.” However, terrorists “in the Islamist orbit,” he insists, “seek unconventional weapons that would allow them to kill a far-larger number of Americans than died on Sept. 11.” 6 Or as Janan Ganesh of the Financial Times puts it, “Bathroom deaths could multiply by 50 without a threat to civil order. The incidence of terror could not.” 7

Thus far, 9/11 stands out as an extreme outlier: scarcely any terrorist act, before or after, in war zones or outside them, has inflicted even one-tenth as much total destruction. That is, contrary to common expectations, the attack has thus far been an aberration, not a harbinger.8 And al-Qaeda central, the group responsible for the attack, has, in some respects at least, proved to resemble President John Kennedy’s assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald—an entity of almost trivial proportions that got horribly lucky once. The tiny group of perhaps 100 or so does appear to have served as something of an inspiration to some Muslim extremists. They may have done some training, may have contributed a bit to the Taliban’s far larger insurgency in Afghanistan, and may have participated in a few terrorist acts in Pakistan. In his examination of the major terrorist plots against the West since 9/11, Mitchell Silber finds only two—the shoe bomber attempt of 2001 and the effort to blow up transatlantic airliners with liquid bombs in 2006—that could be said to be under the “command and control” of al-Qaeda central (as opposed to ones suggested, endorsed, or inspired by the organization), and there are questions about how full its control was even in these two instances, both of which, as it happens, failed miserably.9 And, although some al-Qaeda affiliates have committed substantial damage in the Middle East, usually in the context of civil wars, their efforts to carry out terrorism in the West have been rare and completely ineffective.10 Even under siege, it is difficult to see why al-Qaeda could not have carried out attacks at least as costly and shocking as the shooting rampages (organized by other groups) that took place in Mumbai in 2008 or at a shopping center in Kenya in 2013. Neither took huge resources, presented major logistical challenges, required the organization of a large number of perpetrators, or needed extensive planning.

However, there is of course no guarantee that things will remain that way, and the 9/11 attacks inspired the remarkable extrapolation that, because the terrorists were successful with box cutters, they might soon be able to turn out weapons of mass destruction— particularly nuclear ones—and then detonate them in an American city. For example, in his influential 2004 book, Nuclear Terrorism, Harvard’s Graham Allison relayed his “considered judgment” that “on the current path, a nuclear terrorist attack on America in the decade ahead is more likely than not.” 11 Allison has had a great deal of company in his alarming pronouncements. In 2007, the distinguished physicist Richard Garwin put the likelihood of a nuclear explosion on an American or European city by terrorist or other means at 20 percent per year, which would work out to 91 percent over the elevenyear period to 2018.12

Allison’s time is up, and so is Garwin’s. These oft-repeated warnings have proven to be empty. And it is important to point out that not only have terrorists failed to go nuclear, but as William Langewiesche, who has assessed the process in detail, put it in 2007, “The best information is that no one has gotten anywhere near this. I mean, if you look carefully and practically at this process, you see that it is an enormous undertaking full of risks for the would-be terrorists.” 13 That process requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew, all the while attracting no attention from outsiders.

Nor have terrorist groups been able to steal existing nuclear weapons—characteristically burdened with multiple safety devices and often stored in pieces at separate secure locales—from existing arsenals as was once much feared. And they certainly have not been able to cajole leaders in nuclear states to palm one off to them—though a war inflicting more death than Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined was launched against Iraq in 2003 in major part under the spell of fantasies about such a handover.14

More generally, the actual terrorist “adversaries” in the West scarcely deserve accolades for either dedication or prowess. It is true, of course, that sometimes even incompetents can get lucky, but such instances, however tragic, are rare. For the most part, terrorists in the United States are a confused, inadequate, incompetent, blundering, and gullible bunch, only occasionally able to get their act together. Most seem to be far better at frenetic and often self-deluded scheming than at actual execution. A summary assessment by RAND’s Brian Jenkins is apt: “their numbers remain small, their determination limp, and their competence poor.” 15 And much the same holds for Europe and the rest of the developed world.16 Also working against terrorist success in the West is the fact that almost all are amateurs: they have never before tried to do something like this. Unlike criminals they have not been able to develop street smarts.

Except perhaps for the use of vehicles to deliver mayhem (though this idea is by no means new in the history of terrorism), there has been remarkably little innovation in terrorist weaponry or methodology since 9/11.17 Like their predecessors, they have continued to rely on bombs (many of which fail to detonate or do much damage) and bullets.18

#### No motive, no opportunity

--CBRN = chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear weapons

Koblentz 20 Dr. Gregory D. Koblentz, Associate Professor and Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University's Schar School of Policy and Government; “Emerging Technologies and the Future of CBRN Terrorism;” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 43, 06-16-2020, Issue 2, Accessed through T&F, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1770969> /GoGreen!

Cautions and Caveats

It is important to note that scientific advances and the emergence of new technologies are not the only, or even the most important, factors influencing the likelihood of terrorist groups acquiring and using CBRN weapons. Thankfully, the number of terrorist groups motivated to acquire these weapons has been limited, despite many that have the requisite technical and financial resources.60 The vast majority of terrorist groups have been satisfied with conventional weapons such as guns and bombs. The surprising rise of the Islamic State and their repeated use of chemical weapons in Iraq and Syria, however, serve as a reminder that it only takes one group with the intent and capability to acquire and use CBRN weapons to pose a threat to international security.61

In addition, the ability of a terrorist group to convert CBRN-related material into a weapon depends on intangible factors such as tacit knowledge (the unarticulated knowledge that can only be gained through hands-on, trial-and-error experience or mentorship), the ability of the group to create and share such knowledge, and its ability to assemble and successfully manage interdisciplinary teams.62 Terrorist groups, especially those facing pressure from law enforcement and intelligence agencies, have had difficulties recruiting, retaining, and effectively utilizing individuals with the right combination of scientific, technical, and organizational skills to develop effective CBRN weapons.

Developing a CBRN weapon capable of causing mass casualties is also a very complex process. A scientific breakthrough that makes developing or acquiring one component of a weapon easier might not have any impact on the other stages in the weaponization process. Thus, the impact of a single scientific breakthrough or a novel technology on the acquisition of a CBRN weapon should not be exaggerated. For example, synthetic biology might make it easier for a non-state actor to create a pathogen, but that technology does not help terrorists improve their ability to disseminate the pathogen on a large scale.63

Likewise, it is important to assess the specific contributions that a particular technology can make to a specific aspect of the CBRN threat in practice, not just in theory. In the case of 3D printing, this manufacturing technology is not appropriate for working with metals that are toxic or radioactive. While microreactors are well-suited to covertly producing small quantities of highly pure chemicals, they are not well-suited to the production of most chemical warfare agents and precursors due to excessive heat generated by their synthesis and by the production of solid byproducts that would clog the microfluidic channels at the heart of this technology.64

Finally, advances in science and technology represent not just threats, but also opportunities to make it harder for terrorist groups to acquire CBRN weapons. Unmanned aerial and ground vehicles can be used for border security, CBRN weapon detection, and bomb disposal. For example, the EU is sponsoring the development of unmanned aerial and ground vehicles to investigate CBRN crime scenes under the ROCSAFE project.65 Biometrics and radio frequency ID chips can be used to improve physical security measures and inventory control to prevent unauthorized access to CBRN materials. Advances in science and technology are also leading to improved sensors that can be used to detect the production, transportation, and use of CBRN weapons. The development of dedicated laboratories and new techniques to analyze CBRN materials has also contributed to impressive advances in nuclear, biological, and chemical forensics, which are crucial for attribution.66

### AT: AM&E I/L

#### The impact’s absurd – no part of SC relationships are truly wasted and trying to mini-max them is as likely to harm as help – BUT the difference is so marginal it can’t affect the balance of power anyway

Reynolds 21 Dr. Phil W. Reynolds, visiting scholar at the Center for Futures Studies at the University of Hawaii, “Building Partner Capacity Is Great Power Competition: The Future of 333 Funds,” Small Wars Journal, 2-6-2021, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/building-partner-capacity-great-power-competition-future-333-funds> /GoGreen!

Can the U.S. Department of Defense do two things at once: Operate in the gray zone and excel in great power competition? Not according to Tommy Ross and Stephen Tankel who argue that security assistance “is focused on the wrong countries and being used to build the wrong capabilities.” Their idea is that competition with China and Russia - great power competition (GPC) - is the priority and all instruments of national power must be bent to that end, at the expense of all other needs. Ross and Tankel conclude that the “United States is no longer well-positioned to use security sector assistance to “compete with China and Russia — especially in ‘gray zone’ activities short of war.” Ross is a former assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation and should know better.

Changes in administrations are an opportunity to reflect on what works and what doesn’t, but in this case, changes in the name of so-called reform could cause real harm. They suggest, in part, converting what are known as building partner capacity (BPC) funds into general-purpose security assistance funds so they may explicitly be used for Great Power Competition — that is, to block China and Russia. That is a fine goal, but there are greater and more effective tools already in use. Security assistance writ large, about $19 billion dollars in 2019, and the deterrent effect of the U.S. armed forces being forward stationed and deployed around the world. Besides, Congress created specific categories of activities in for BPC which lie in the gray zone like counter terrorism operations, countering illicit drug trafficking, countering organized crime, supporting intelligence operations and supporting multi-national operations- like AMISOM in Somalia and the G5 Sahel. These funds are critical in providing equipment and training support against various insurgent, transnational terrorists and smuggling threats in twenty-one countries. Moving those funds from these conflicts to support great-power competition would result in the abandonment of those partners who are now decisively engaged on the United States’ behalf. There is real danger to a U.S. withdrawal of support to these fragile partners.

What are building partner capacity funds? They are a basket of congressional authorizations meant to counter urgent and emergent threats. In various forms, they have been around for three administrations. In the early 2000s, the DOD needed an authorization to quickly buttress and fund operations with smaller countries not in formal alliances like NATO or through the cumbersome existing security assistance framework of foreign military financing and sales. The zeitgeist of BPC funds was to quickly provide rifles, trucks, radios, and ammunition, along with training, to partner states who were fighting terrorists and insurgencies that were critical to U.S. security. These funds were meant for partner states actually engaged in the business of killing bad guys. Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, which gobbled up billions of dollars, building partner capacity funds have been small. BPC funds have gone through several iterations since their introduction in 2006. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act re-authorized the largest part of the funds under section 333. They have never exceeded 1 percent of the DOD budget. In 2020, 333 Global Train and Equip fund, made up less than 0.14% of the defense budget.

Where have 333 funds been used? Since 2017, they have been used in Burkina Faso, Chad, Cameroon, supporting Uganda, Kenya, and Djibouti in the UN mission in Somalia. Worldwide, they have been used in the Philippines, Vietnam, Jordan, Uzbekistan and even Mexico. Earlier versions of BPC funds were used in Hungary, Indonesia, Georgia, Latvia, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Poland and Romania. In Africa in particular, the need is urgent. That is exactly where these funds should be deployed to allow the rest of the billions and billions of dollars of security assistance to be spent more directly against China and Russia in.

A Holding Action

First and foremost, building partner capacity is a holding action, a strategic defensive effort in order that the United States and its Allies can deter Russia and China with infantry divisions, fighter jets and aircraft carriers in other theaters. Building partner capacity (BPC) funds are not meant to be decisive. They buy time against the violence and instability of the gray zone. That zone is where malign actors create chaos and seek to replace legitimate authority in its wake. On one side is the area the U.S. and the international community can access, and on the other, are the forces that seek to confront the U.S. In Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, attacks by Islamic State and al Qaeda affiliates have increased dramatically since 2015, with more than 4000 deaths reported in 2019. The U.S. must stay engaged in that gray zone. This is the penultimate problem with the assertion that security assistance is out of sync with U.S. priorities and these “shortcomings hinder U.S. allies and partners, in turn leaving them vulnerable to Chinese and Russian influence” that reveals a deep misunderstanding of the strategy behind BPC funds. BPC funds are exactly how the U.S. remains engaged in competition with Russia and China in the gray zone.

A withdrawal of BPC funds or redirection in their uses would be tantamount to abandonment of the ideals of building up partners. The Department of Defense could just find itself in a deeper hole ten years hence, anxiously requesting another funding stream to counter the same, bigger, more dangerous threats. That is on the horizon: For example, Burkina Faso is the focal point of an increasingly complex regional war in which jihadist groups take advantage of nonexistent border security. This in turn has exacerbated and amplified local grievances about corruption and bad governance. An attack killed 36 in a village market in January 2020, and in October, another 20 were killed in the north of the country. The violence moves across international borders with impunity. This is typical of the vast trans-Sahel region in which the reach of the central state governments closely follows the roads and towns, with millions of square kilometers of scrub and desert left with only the lightest touch of government authority. In 2012, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad in Mali teamed up with heavily armed Toureg nomads back from the Libyan Civil war. The group captured key cities and declared northern Mali an Islamic state. The short, sharp civil war toppled the Malian president in a coup in March 2012, resulting in the French Government deploying 4,000 soldiers to push back the Islamist groups. In August 2020, another coup toppled the latest leader of Mali. Building partner capacity funds are used in each country for air reconnaissance assets, long range communications, and heavy-duty desert vehicles, along with training on how to tie them all together in operations. This contributes to partner’s internal stability, thus keeping them in the fold of international norms and values, and more resistant to Chinese and Russian influence.

China and Russia behind the Gray Zone

If the U.S. pulls back from these areas of conflict, China and Russia will step in. In many cases, it is because of the security situation and corruption that U.S. companies hesitate to operate. For China and Russia, concerns over human rights abuses matter little. Chinese investment in Africa tops $200 billion per year and since 2015, Beijing has provided $120 billion in financial aid. In Burkina Faso, China is building a $140 million hospital and a $1.3 billion dollar road. In Guinea, another west African country, China has provided $20 billion in loans to develop bauxite mines and another $14 billion for iron developments. In Mali, the Chinese have invested $11 billion in infrastructure deals.

It is true that many of these failing states are run by corrupt, narcissistic family and clan confederations whose human rights records are little better than the insurgent terrorists who seek to replace them. Security assistance funds provide an important foot in the door for the U.S. in these developing nations. It is particularly important because these weak countries view many of the U.S. State Department’s activities as subversive and possibly corrosive to their own authority. Building partner capacity (BPC) funds are security funds and that is simple enough to understand. If this ‘foot-in-the-door’ is removed, Chinese dollars will work just as well, their thinking goes. If the U.S. were to retreat along the line presented by Ross and Tankel, the line of instability would move, allowing the space behind to be filled by Russia and particularly, China. The places where Chinese money is invested would need security and already China has peacekeepers in Congo, Liberia, Mali, Sudan and South Sudan. China also partially funds the G5 Sahel Joint Force.

Perhaps more baldly, and thus more surprising that Ross and Tankel missed it, these small countries vote in the big international organizations, like the United Nations and the World Trade Organization. These potential allies will be needed in the coalitions of international cooperation that President Joe Biden looks to lead. Thwarting Russia and China short of actual war will require a broad coalition of countries voting on issues ranging from climate change to fair trade. Already, China uses dollar diplomacy to keep vulnerable, weak states in its orbit. It won over Burkina Faso in 2019, at the same time China offered to pay for security forces in the Sahel. BPC funds, for all their simplicity, can help buy votes, too.

The Last 1%?

Great power competition is real and is the priority of the Department of Defense. Ross and Tankel are correct in that. However, they lose sight of the billions and billions spent on great power competition. Since it is the priority, one could say that great-power competition consumes 99% of the Department of Defense budget. That is tanks, aircraft carriers, attack helicopters and missiles. That is personnel and their pay and benefits. That is all the training and exercises in the plains of central Europe and the seas in Southeast Asia. The U.S ability to curtail Chinese and Russian expansion in the gray zone is enormously important. Why would the last 1% be eyed for use in Europe and Northeast Asia?

It is because the bureaucracy simply cannot imagine low-level conflict as a useful means to a larger end. Slow to adapt, grinding, and loath to change, the Department of Defense was created for great power war and it requires expensive kit- missile defense, ships, tanks and fighter jets like the trillion dollar F35 and B21 programs, and the Gerald Ford aircraft carrier. Security assistance, run through the State Department, and the even bigger foreign military sales efforts have provided this kind of equipment since the 1960s. There is seduction in the simplicity of big wars. They are easy to understand, plan for, and win. From pre-commissioning training to the flag officer level, planning is oriented toward maneuvering divisions, corps and carrier air wings, the gotterdammerung of the decisive battle (a horrible misapplication of Clausewitz). This is the American way of war, with technology, mass, and speed. Unfortunately, this creates an amaranthine loop of organizational bias and coercive information processing routines that in turn produce values and norms about the way things are and the way things should be. BPC funds are meant for smaller, simpler tasks, not part of the U.S. main effort in its big wars. After 9/11 the Department of Defense needed a tool for engagement- thus the creation of these types of funds. Planning and execution have proceeded apace since. Ross and Tankel have also taken to task the planning superstructure for these funds. Their suggestion of creating “coordinated, department-wide planning processes at the departments of State and Defense” is also wide of the mark. There is already a joint review and approval process that begins eighteen to twenty-four months out from execution. There is even a capstone review conference called the Joint Security Sector Assistance Review that seeks to capture issues and recommendations for improvement in future execution cycles. Creating new human infrastructure, boards, bureaus, cells, and diagrams would invite more of the very “inefficient and incoherent planning and coordination processes” that Ross and Tankel seek to improve.

Considering the price point and investment level of BPC funds, they have been successful. They have paid for support to the AMISOM peacekeeping mission in Somalia and strengthened the Jordanian efforts against ISIS and Al Qaeda. They proved instrumental in providing real capabilities in Tunisia’s struggle against trans-national violence spilling over from Libya. The 333 funds, and other, even smaller building partner capacity authorizations have made a difference in these places where the average cost per capacity building program is just $5.5 million. There does exist the dubious idea is that these small funds could be deployed quickly to support and guide partners towards larger, and much more lucrative purchases of military equipment. This destroys the original intent of 333 funds. Congress has seen the importance of having separate authorities to do separate things, and this should be preserved. If BPC funds are amalgamated into the framework that provides big weapons and expensive capabilities, like fighter-jets, hyper-advanced, secure communications, and cyber security apparatus, it will take away, in some cases, the only incentive for partners to meet and fight terrorists. The knock-on effect is losing a strong method for deterring method of deterring Chinese and Russian aspirations in these gray zones.

Conclusion

Overall, the U.S. spends about $18 billion globally on various security assistance authorizations. The question that appears not to be asked in wise councils is "Would this tiny .14% make a difference in great power competition?" Already, the vast majority of security assistance funding does go towards great power competition via foreign military financing and sales. Other initiatives are not small. The European Deterrence Initiative focused on Russia sits at $6 billion, the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, provides $250 million, the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative is funded at $425 million. Congress is set to authorize the Pacific Deterrence Initiative with has much as $6 billion over two years. Now, the bureaucracy wants the .14 percent of the budget meant to fight terrorism around the world.

Finally, the U.S. pays $700 billion a year for the world’s largest defense establishment on the premise that this massive juggernaut is needed for deterrence. In this case, it doesn’t make sense that another $700 million will make a difference. The very idea is staggering: Is there no deterrent effect in all those divisions and aircraft carriers? There is, however, a very real deterrent in strengthening small partners quickly and effectively. The Department of Defense can walk and chew gum at the same time. At least Congress thinks so, hence the categories legislated in the building partner capacity authorization. The U.S. will not send infantry divisions to west Africa; it can and should support governments in improving their own security. The DOD can confront China, Russia and provide capacity support to friends in the fight. For less than a billion dollars a year, the decision is a no-brainer.

#### Empirics disprove – AM&E itself is waste

Görgens 5 Marelize Görgens, World Bank, HIV/AIDS Monitoring and Evaluation consultant, “Monitoring and Evaluation Systems for HIV/AIDS: chasing data or challenging paradigms?” November 2005, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/291347597_Monitoring_and_Evaluation_Systems_for_HIVAIDS_chasing_data_or_challenging_paradigms> /GoGreen!

Within the international development arena, the past few years has witnessed a move towards measured, progress-focused development, as illustrated by the birth of terms such as “effective aid ” and “managing for development results ” at various international forums. For example, at a global meeting of development partners in 2004, , the discussions centred on how to strengthen an international partnership around the concept of ’managing for development results’. This upped the stakes for monitoring and evaluation (M&E), in the sense that the Joint Memorandum, which was issued by all these global partners at the end of their meeting, focused not only on M&E processes itself, but also on using results for improvement and decision-making.

“[We will] rely on – and strengthen – countries’ monitoring and evaluation systems to track progress and assess outcomes. As agencies with regional or global reach, we pledge to better distill the lessons of countries’ experiences and disseminate knowledge about what gets results in different country contexts.”

Joint Memorandum, issued by all global development partners at the end of the 2nd Roundtable on Managing for Development Results

Despite pressure from international development partners to measure and quantify results, M&E has remained the ugly duckling of development. Efforts to incorporate it into practice have met with a combination of apathy, resistance, and half-baked efforts that primarily consisted of throwing together a few indicators and defining how the data would be collected.

Developments in the field of HIV/AIDS monitoring and evaluation over the last 10 years has illustrated the challenges of monitoring and evaluating of development efforts in general, and raised some uncomfortable, close-to-home questions for the development M&E profession.

In Africa in particular, HIV/AIDS M&E is not only important because of international pressure on managing for development results, but also because of the scale of the virus’s impact. HIV/AIDS has ravaged Africa. A continent-wide Social Impact Assessment would have revealed that it has destroyed families, torn apart communities, paralysed the health sector, crippled the agricultural and education sectors, hampered government’s efforts to provide effective services to its people, and caused indescribable long-term trauma and grief. The extent and reach of its impact over such a short period of time is forcing national AIDS coordinating structures to focus, maybe for the first time, on ways to find real, effective, efficient, and replicable solutions.

At the international level and at the country level, the response to HIV/AIDS has moved in the past 10 years from a health sector-driven to a multisectoral response. In parallel, HIV/AIDS monitoring and evaluation has evolved from exclusively epidemiological surveillance in the 1980s to multi discipline approaches to HIV/AIDS M&E.

B What are the challenges?

HIV/AIDS M&E cannot be a disjointed collection of evaluation studies and monitoring processes, but needs one integrated HIV/AIDS M&E system, managed by a National AIDS Commission (NAC) MG comment: some countries do not have NACs, so it may be better to refer to it as the national AIDS coordinating structures. This is because the NAC has the mandate to coordinate and manage the national HIV response and can only do this if it has accurate and relevant data when decisions need to be made. It is also because it was recently acknowledged, internationally, that one M&E framework at country level is one of the core principles of effective management of the HIV response .

Such an HIV/AIDS M&E system needs to combine a vast variety of M&E processes: from biological sentinel surveillance (an epidemiological “tripwire” used to detect trends in HIV infection); to routine collection of management information about funding for HIV interventions in the public sector, private sector and civil society; and ethnographic-type studies about sexual risk behaviour and the abuse of right of vulnerable children, the elderly and persons living with AIDS.

HIV/AIDS M&E requires that, in order to assess the extent and nature of HIV service coverage, the same output-level, programme-monitoring data be collected from all implementers of HIV interventions on a routine basis. The health sector in Africa has struggled to establish an effective management information system in its own sector – NACs are now obliged to set up a such a routine system across all government ministries, the private sector, and the entire civil society. This is a vast undertaking, especially given that some of these organisations have never had to report to government before. Another challenge is that the HIV response is increasingly becoming decentralised. This adds a layer of reporting and could potentially cause delays in data collection.

HIV interventions range dramatically in content, focus, and implementation methodology. For example, interventions focusing on establishing partnerships for HIV will have vastly different monitoring and evaluation approaches to programmes that aim to keep educationally marginalised children in school.

The impact of HIV has necessitated that there is a real focus on using results for decision-making and programme improvement because countries in Africa heavily burdened by HIV/AIDS cannot afford not to.

B What can be done?

Addressing these challenges requires a systemic approach: we need to focus on designing and operationalising national HIV/AIDS M&E systems, rather than new evaluation studies.

Figure 1 illustrates such a systemic approach to HIV/AIDS M&E. It shows the relationship between indicators (A), data sources (B), information products (C) and the project stakeholders (D). These four components will only work in unison if it is backed up by strong management.

Figure 1: Illustration of Systemic Approach to HIV/AIDS M&E

At the risk of revamping an old development phrase, a systemic approach to HIV/AIDS M&E require those involved in the M&E profession to change. It requires a paradigm shift away from conducting piecemeal, complicated, and specialised monitoring or evaluation studies and towards thinking about monitoring and evaluation in an operational way, focusing on synergies, sometimes at the expense of individual academic accolades.

B The Way Forward

Such an approach requires that M&E professionals:

•Learn new skills: they need to become good budgeters, M&E work plan developers and M&E strategists.

•Move away from focusing on specific processes and towards integrated monitoring and evaluation systems, which re-examines the practicalities of collecting output data.

•Use existing tools in a new way: For example, Social Impact Assessments have, to date, primarily been used to assess the impact of planned developments (e.g. assessing the social impact of a new mine on a community’s livelihood). The tools in the quiver of the Social Impact Assessment process (including trend extensions, computer modelling, consulting experts, focus group discussion and questionnaires) could be adapted to even suit assessments of the unplanned, catalytic, and widespread impact of HIV and AIDS on different sectors of society.

•Assess the cost-benefit trade-off in different monitoring and evaluation tools and processes to find, recommend, and use those processes that are most useful for the most reasonable cost

•Be prepared to sacrifice some professional autonomy for the sake of synchronisation. In one country in Africa, in 2004, over 40 assessments relating to HIV/AIDS M&E were done, often replicating each other.

•Understand how HIV/AIDS M&E systems should be managed to yield the best possible success; it implies advocacy for M&E, capacity building in M&E and communications about M&E

•Find a renewed focus to make sure that results are used to improve projects.

•Go back to the basics of data collection, and apply it with new vigour in a multi-sectoral, decentralised, developing and emergency context.

•Think of practical ways in which to focus on, promote and institutionalise the process of using results for decision-making. This means moving away from the typical thinking in which M&E systems have focused on indicators and data sources, with less focus on information products and dissemination to stakeholders (see Figure 2). It also implies avoiding a situation where stakeholder dissemination is done as an afterthought, primarily through a national level workshop.

Figure 2: Disproportionate focus on Indicators and Data Sources

The challenges of HIV/AIDS monitoring and evaluation systems cut to the heart of the monitoring and evaluation profession. Although we have always known that monitoring and evaluation needs to earn its keep (Patton, 2000), it is nowhere more evident than in the design and implementation of HIV/AIDS M&E systems. Every dollar that is spent on monitoring and evaluation is one that it not spent on HIV programme implementation. Within the context of HIV/AIDS, this can simply not be wasted.

HIVAIDS is an opportunity for our profession to prove M&E as a real, tangible and value adding part of development work, and as an opportunity for professionals to demystify monitoring and evaluation. We have a responsibility to do so, and there has never been a better time.

#### Even if it works, results won’t be used effectively

Lahaye 20 Estelle Lahaye, Senior Financial Sector Specialist at CGAP, former account manager in Luxembourg at Banco Itaú Europa, MS Business, San Francisco State University, BS banking, finance, and insurance, University of Nancy 2 in France; and Alice Nègre, Senior Financial Sector Specialist at CGAP, graduated from ESCP, Paris; “How Can Funders Avoid Chasing Data as the Latest Shiny Object?” CGAP Blog, 12-8-2020, <https://www.cgap.org/blog/how-can-funders-avoid-chasing-data-latest-shiny-object> /GoGreen!

We don’t need to preach to the choir: given the plethora of data-related projects that donors and development finance institutions (DFIs) have supported in the past, they clearly know that data is a powerful tool for advancing financial inclusion. And there is a lot to be excited about, given how digital technologies are accelerating the speed, depth and breadth of available data.

We share this excitement. In fact, data is at the heart of CGAP’s work. In recent years, we have talked about data-based segmentation to better serve customers, data sharing to enable innovation, data protection and how data capabilities need to be revamped to implement risk-based supervision.

But is data just the latest shiny object of the financial inclusion community? Are data’s powers fully leveraged? Does more data lead to sustainable impact?

Today, we think the jury is out on all three of these questions. Our research shows that more and better data in the hands of providers, regulators, policy makers, investors and customers doesn’t automatically lead to better outcomes. Results often show that these market actors do not use data or have stopped using data after a while.

That’s why, for us, the real excitement lies beyond data. It is about bringing fresh thinking to help donors and DFIs achieve sustainable impact through their data efforts. Based on our research, we have four recommendations:

Do not overestimate data as a driver of change. Increased knowledge with data does not necessarily incentivize behavior change. For example, robust data on women's demand and need for financial services will not automatically lead providers to improve their suite of products and services. A detailed theory of change (ToC) will help donors and DFIs to clarify the chain of incentives and behavior changes that a data initiative seeks to trigger. Make sure the pathway from data to expected outcomes is clear.

### Thumper – Ukraine

#### Ukraine thumps – and more unexpected arms increases are coming

Ryan 6-14-22 Missy Ryan, reports on diplomacy, national security and the State Department for The Washington Post; and Emily Rauhala, Brussels bureau chief for The Washington Post, covering the European Union and NATO; “Ukraine battle intensifies as Western backers mull new military aid,” The Washington Post, 6-14-2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/06/14/severodonetsk-weapons-nato-russian-advance/> /GoGreen!

Russia intensified its assault on a strategic Ukrainian city on Tuesday as NATO officials prepared to debate increased military support for Kyiv’s attempt to reverse Russian momentum in the country’s east.

Officials in the eastern city of Severodonetsk said that Ukrainian forces were mounting a pitched defense of an area that is now a central focus of Russian firepower. Mayor Oleksandr Stryuk described “constant fighting” for Severodonetsk, which has become increasingly isolated following the destruction of bridges leading out of the city. He said Russian troops so far have been unable to complete their control of the area.

“Street fighting is underway,” Stryuk said. “Tactically, our armed forces are pushing back the enemy,” an effort that he said relies on a “huge amount of manpower.”

Serhiy Haidai, governor of the Luhansk region where Severodonetsk is located, said that humanitarian supplies could no longer be delivered to the city. The two sides have exchanged accusations about who is responsible for destroying the bridges, which permit the movement of civilians and aid but also military equipment and troops.

Capturing Severodonetsk and neighboring Lysychansk, which lies across the Siversky Donets river, would represent a major step forward in President Vladimir Putin’s quest to solidify control of eastern Ukraine, and would mark a Russian revival following the battlefield failures that characterized the early stage of the war.

Even as Ukrainian forces face mounting setbacks in the Donbas campaign, officials in Kyiv have vowed to retake every inch of Russian-controlled territory, including Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014, but they say greater outside help is required.

Haidai said conditions for civilians remaining in Severodonesk are now “extremely difficult.” In echoes of the extended siege of the southern city of Mariupol, officials have said that some 500 people, including dozens of children, are sheltering in bunkers beneath the city’s Azot chemical plant.

On Tuesday, a top Russian military official offered a humanitarian corridor to permit the evacuation of civilians trapped at the plant. In a statement, Col. Gen. Mikhail Mizintsev said the evacuees would be permitted to travel to the Russian-controlled city of Svatove. Ukrainian civilians forced to evacuate to areas under Russian control have complained of abuse and degrading treatment at filtration camps.

Mizintsev, who heads Russia’s National Defense Control Center, accused Ukraine of positioning civilians at the plant as human shields. He demanded the surrender of Ukrainian troops there, characterizing them as “militants of nationalist battalions and foreign mercenaries.”

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky renewed his appeal on Tuesday for greater military aid to help Ukraine defend itself in Luhansk and other areas, saying that only greater quantities of air and missile defense systems can help stave off Russia’s larger, more advanced military. Those weapons are expected to be of increased importance in the artillery-heavy battle for the Donbas region.

Zelensky cited missile attacks near Lviv and Ternopil on Tuesday, which he said Ukrainian forces had been able to only partially defend against.

“We keep telling our partners that Ukraine needs modern antimissile weapons. Our country does not have it at a sufficient level yet,” he said in a nightly video address. “Delay with its provision cannot be justified.”

How much new weaponry is provided, and what kind, may be defined on Wednesday when officials gather in Brussels for a meeting of the s Ukraine “defense contact group,” which will be chaired by U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.

Austin touched down in Belgium on Tuesday ahead of that gathering, which is expected to include up to 50 countries, and a separate meeting of NATO defense ministers being held ahead of a June 29 alliance summit in Madrid.

When NATO foreign ministers convened in April, Ukraine told the alliance its priority issue was “weapons, weapons, weapons” — a message that is likely to be reiterated this week as the conflict drags through its fourth month.

While the Biden administration has not revealed its plans, the Pentagon’s top policy official on Tuesday suggested it would send additional multiple-launch rocket systems to Ukraine, potentially going farther to satisfy Ukrainian demands.

Colin Kahl, who serves as undersecretary of defense for policy, said the four M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, which can hit targets at longer distance, that Washington has sent to Ukraine to date did not represent the end of its supply of such weapons.

“We’re going to provide the Ukrainians what they need to prosecute the targets inside Ukrainian territory,” Kahl said during a think tank event in Washington. Ukrainian officials have said they need at least 60 such systems.

Western leaders have gradually increased the array of arms they are willing to provide Ukraine since the beginning of the war. But many remain nervous about supplying systems that could be used to launch attacks deep into Russian territory or that Putin might use as a reason to strike a NATO country.

In separate discussions in Brussels on Thursday, NATO allies are expected to discuss a range of broader issues, including the alliance’s troop footprint in Eastern Europe and defense spending, conversations that will continue at the late June summit in Madrid.

#### Ukraine will remain a more urgent priority

DoS 6-1-22 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine,” Fact Sheet, 6-1-2022, <https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine/> /GoGreen!

The United States, our allies, and our partners worldwide are united in support of Ukraine in response to Russia’s premeditated, unprovoked, and unjustified war against Ukraine. We have not forgotten Russia’s earlier aggression in eastern Ukraine and occupation following its unlawful seizure of Crimea in 2014. The United States reaffirms its unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, extending to its territorial waters.

Ukraine is a key regional strategic partner that has undertaken significant efforts to modernize its military and increase its interoperability with NATO. It remains an urgent security assistance priority to provide Ukraine the equipment it needs to defend itself against Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Since January 2021, the United States has invested more than $5.3 billion in security assistance to demonstrate our enduring and steadfast commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. This includes more than $4.6 billion since Russia’s launched its premeditated, unprovoked, and brutal war against Ukraine on February 24. Since 2014, the United States has provided more than $7.3 billion in security assistance for training and equipment to help Ukraine preserve its territorial integrity, secure its borders, and improve interoperability with NATO.

### Thumper – Taiwan

#### Taiwan thumps – it’s being prioritized

Nakamura 6-13-22 Ryo Nakamura, Nikkei staff writer, “U.S., Taiwan set to hold strategic dialogue this month: sources,” Nikkei Asia, 6-13-2022, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/U.S.-Taiwan-set-to-hold-strategic-dialogue-this-month-sources> /GoGreen!

The U.S. and Taiwan are in the final stages of preparation for a strategic bilateral dialogue between security officials, three people with knowledge of the matter told Nikkei.

The dialogue, scheduled to take place by the end of this month in the U.S., is expected to focus on specific measures for weapons provision and military drills.

Officials from the two sides will discuss details of security cooperation under a regular framework known as the "Monterey talks" -- last held in autumn 2021 in the U.S., according to Taiwanese media. As a general rule, neither plans for the talks nor details are publicly disclosed.

One of the sources said the key theme for the upcoming dialogue would be weapons support from the U.S., with Washington aiming to prioritize the sale of weapons that would be effective in blocking potential Chinese landing operations on the island.

The U.S. Congress is considering a plan to provide several billion dollars of financial support to Taiwan so the island can procure weapons, Nikkei reported last month, citing three sources connected to the legislature.

The Biden administration intends to prioritize the sale of weapons with what it calls "asymmetric capabilities" -- those that are agile, inexpensive and effective in dealing with Chinese amphibious operations. Specifically, they cover anti-ship missiles and air defense systems, as well as systems for gathering intelligence needed to identify enemy movements and for initiating early warnings.

But F-16 fighter jets, which the U.S. government has already decided to sell to Taiwan, might not fall under this category. This implies that the bar for additional fighter jet sales may be set higher in the future.

By prioritizing asymmetric weapons, the U.S. intends to quicken reinforcement of capabilities in preventing the Chinese military from landing operations on Taiwan. It also aims to encourage Taiwan to allocate its budget more efficiently on the defense front.

It appears that the U.S. has prepared a list of weapons and systems it recommends Taiwan to purchase, and selected about 20 specific weapons and other items as preferred subjects of sale.

Taiwan was a hot theme at the weekend's Shangri-La Dialogue security summit in Singapore.

"Now, as a part of our One China policy, we will continue to fulfill our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act," U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said on Saturday. "And that includes assisting Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability."

### N/L – No Tradeoff + Thumpers

#### NO link uniqueness NOR internal link – there will always be a higher-priority SC crisis – Ukraine and Taiwan thump – AND black swans are inevitable – BUT DoD planners can walk and chew gum

Sprenger 22 Sebastian Sprenger, Europe editor and former managing editor for Defense News; Joe Gould, senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News; “US military readies to ‘walk and chew gum’ as multiple crises loom,” Defense News, 1-28-2022, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/01/28/us-military-readies-to-walk-and-chew-gum-as-multiple-crises-loom/> /GoGreen!

As roughly 100,000 Russian troops amass around Ukraine, a series of emerging crises around the world — the Middle East, China, North Korea — are demanding the full attention of NATO, and particularly its most powerful member, the United States.

Now, there’s a growing sense among national security experts that the crisis in Ukraine is just one of many conflicts on the precipice, putting pressure on the alliance and its member countries to address this threat and at the same time brace for the next one.

Indeed, China this week flew 39 warplanes toward Taiwan. And consider the United Arab Emirates reported this week it had intercepted multiple ballistic missiles aimed at Abu Dhabi.

Julianne Smith, the U.S. ambassador to NATO, described the ongoing dispute between Russia and Ukraine as a “microcosm” of the types of threats Western analysts were expecting all along. “All of this is becoming very real,” she said this week at a panel in Brussels sponsored by the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

At the same time, “something could happen on China and Taiwan next week,” said Ian Lesser, vice president at the think tank, referring to the possibility of China attacking the U.S.-backed island nation that Beijing sees as a renegade province to be eventually united with the mainland.

Asked about that possibility on Thursday, Defense Department spokesman John Kirby said the military remains watchful of other theaters.

“I think the gist of your question is, why can’t we walk and chew gum at the same time,” he told reporters at the Pentagon. “We can, and we are. … Just because we’re focused on bolstering our allies because of the worrisome accumulation of combat-credible power by the Russians in and around Ukraine doesn’t mean that we aren’t focused on the pacing challenge that China represents to the department.”

As NATO tries to use diplomacy to defuse tensions in Ukraine, planners are finding the standoff reflects many of the characteristics slated to make up the alliance’s new strategic concept.

Analysts have long said the upcoming revision, up for approval at the alliance’s Madrid summit in late June, must consider defenses against information warfare, cyber attacks, economic pressure and an overall increase in conflict complexity that exceeds that of traditional military operations.

Much of that is happening right now,

With NATO and U.S. written responses delivered to Moscow on Wednesday, diplomacy is still running its course. Russia wants the alliance to close the door to an eventual Ukrainian membership, a prospect considered notional at best even within NATO.

Alliance officials, in turn, have touted the principle that Russia’s neighbor nations should be able to pick their own path in matters of defense and security.

That idea doesn’t sit well with the Kremlin, where President Vladimir Putin is nursing dreams of restoring past Russian grandeur along ethnic, religious and language lines, incorporating some of its neighbors, according to Western analysts.

Still, the guns remained silent on mid-day Friday.

“I think the West is doing fairly well in managing a conflict that cannot be deterred,” said Hal Brands, a senior fellow with Washington-based American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think tank, and a professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

Brands said he believes Moscow’s demands were so outrageous an eventual armed confrontation was likely baked into them from the start. At this point, he said, Putin may be more interested in continuing the pace of escalation rather than agreeing to a diplomatic solution.

Deterrence has been the name of the game in Europe, however, where countries are trumpeting weapon shipments large and small into Ukraine, publicly scorning the one government not going along: Berlin.

European countries still view their relationship with Russia through bilateral lenses, said Rachel Rizzo, an analyst with the Atlantic Council think tank. “That’s why they are sidelined,” she added, referring to the fact that the European Union has no formal role in the ongoing negotiations.

German government officials have defended their position of sending only help that neither shoots nor explodes, like helmets, arguing a plus-up in combat capabilities would be too insignificant to warrant undermining Berlin’s policy of hopeful hedging. But inside the country, some analysts are arguing it’s time to take a stance militarily.

The situation is emblematic for how disjointed Europe’s position continues to be on key defense issues, and how its biggest economic player is finding itself isolated, said Christian Mölling of the Berlin-based German Council on Foreign Relations.

“We have left a vacuum that the Americans are forced to fill once again,” he said.

### N/L – No Tradeoff XT

#### There’s no trade-off between AM&E and SC programs

Shea 5 Colonel Timothy C. Shea, US Army, associate director of the Senior Executive Seminar for the College of International and Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, “Transforming Military Diplomacy,” Joint Forces Quarterly, iss.38, 2005, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA522974.pdf> /GoGreen! \*added [eclipse]

The defense attaché system structure, mission, and manning have not evolved with the changes of the last decade that require increased levels of involvement in operational activity. The primary attaché function of observing and reporting is often considered to be in direct conflict with time and energy spent on other nonintelligence activities. Intelligence and military-diplomatic activity are not zero-sum competing requirements. Narrow specialization by other DOD elements has undermined the overall effectiveness of the military attaché by reducing access to the host nation military. DOD representation abroad should be the military attaché. Security assistance and arms control would be better managed by trained attachés with the requisite language skills, cultural knowledge, and regional expertise. This approach would eliminate parochialism, reduce overhead, streamline operations, and simplify bilateral coordination for the host nation military.

Transformation of the military attaché corps begins at the higher headquarters. The nature and function of a headquarters influence the priorities of its subordinate elements. By eliminating stovepipe organizations inside the U.S. Embassy in a consolidated DAO, the combatant command headquarters will need to establish a Politico-Military Directorate to manage, deconflict, and synchronize the activities of military attachés. This transformed organization will integrate national requirements for observing and reporting, supporting operational and exercise taskings, security assistance, and strategy and policy. More coherent policy and guidance will enable the military attachés to apply the informational instrument of national power more effectively. Making the director of this new organization within each combatant command a general/flag officer with attaché experience will brighten the promotion prospects for attaché duty and attract higher quality officers.

Realigned Mission Priorities

Security cooperation and the war on terror have increased the strategic importance of military attachés serving abroad. Considering the extensive actions to coordinate the deployment of U.S. forces against the Taliban in Afghanistan and support the train-and-equip operation in Georgia, attachés provide a tremendous value to the combatant commanders as operators and reporters. Independent of transformation, they have four main missions that seamlessly blend.

Advising the Ambassador. Military attachés must know the host nation military and strategic environment and be intimate with the U.S. military’s capabilities to support diplomatic and engagement measures. The DATT provides advice on the full range of issues concerning regional security, to include the attitudes and intentions of the host nation and other nations engaged in regional activities. Finally, most DATTs also serve as the U.S. defense representative charged with managing the coordination of administrative and security matters of all DOD personnel who fall under responsibility of the U.S. Ambassador. However, this command relationship would be more effective with defense attachés assigned to the same higher headquarters as the other DOD elements—the combatant command.

Representing DOD to the host nation. More than playing a ceremonial role, military attachés are a highly visible symbol of the Armed Forces. Especially critical in Eurasia where the Iron Curtain allowed for little interaction with Americans during the Cold War, they provide daily access to the host nation military regarding information, capabilities, and strategies. They are generally contacted before all others in a crisis. They serve a large public diplomacy function as well.

Reporting conditions in the host country. Attachés observe military conditions and developments. This is a continuous mission that must be integrated into all their activities. To succeed in security cooperation, policymakers and decisionmakers require actionable information. It is often attaché input that makes for effective security cooperation programs. During periods of heightened tension and crisis, the attaché supports the combatant commander by becoming his eyes and ears on the scene, responding quickly to time-sensitive information requirements. Increasingly, military attachés serve as the conduit for sharing information, especially in support of the war on terror. Lastly, corruption remains a huge problem in Eurasia, and military attachés provide oversight to monitor whether U.S. resources and funds are used appropriately.

Managing security cooperation programs. Worldwide, about half of all DAOs manage formal security assistance programs such as the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program and Foreign Military Financing (FMF). In activities unique to the former Soviet Union, the military attaché already plays a substantial role in coordinating and executing the extensive military-to-military programs, exercises, and deployments, which frequently dwarf [eclipse] IMET and FMF responsibilities. Even in countries with security assistance offices, attachés still make recommendations on spending priorities and approve IMET candidates.

Improved Manning Posture

Many DATT positions in remote regions are occupied by hard-working but junior majors or senior first-time attachés with limited choices for their terminal assignment. Lack of experience, language skills, rank, or maturity is not a recipe for success. Many countries recognize the strategic importance of their military attachés and send only their best abroad. Because of the symbolic and ceremonial importance of rank, and the requirement for experience and maturity, DATT billets should be filled by colonels (or Navy captains) and represented by the service that logically corresponds to that which dominates in the host country. Most importantly, DAOs must have sufficient depth to permit attachés to operate in multiple geographical locations.

To what degree is the United States able to resort to military power without dependence on foreign governments? The military attaché manages the day-to-day bilateral relations for national policymakers and combatant commanders. Transforming the attaché corps will substantially improve the steady state military diplomacy that must be conducted prior to any crisis. Changing the status quo will improve interagency coordination and provide the combatant commander the representation he needs within his area of responsibility. The military attaché corps must adapt to the new strategic environment, which demands skillful military diplomacy and knowledgeable professionals. Like the Special Operations Soldiers who achieved fame in Afghanistan by demonstrating their strategic value, military attachés have the potential to provide significant returns in the area of military diplomacy, while at the same time providing better reporting on a wider range of important issues.

### N/L – Budget Space

#### DoD’s programming is flexible – has the budgetary space to accommodate the plan

Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/> /GoGreen!

DOD officials can work around the State Department’s diplomats. In part due to restrictions from the Budget Control Act and with new programs at the DOD, Pentagon officials had more flexibility on security assistance programs than their State Department counterparts. The DOD had budgetary space to reallocate significant funds from the substantial Pentagon budget to respond to sudden emergencies or new crises, something that is virtually impossible for the State Department, making the DOD often the lead actor in a crisis.44 Regional combatant commands aggressively sought more resources from Congress to conduct their own security assistance programs, giving them added flexibility to work with partners in the field that their State Department counterparts lacked.45 A Government Accountability Office report found that 56 DOD security assistance programs do not require any involvement from the State Department.46

### N/L – Plan Funds

#### Funding is normal means

DoD 21 (Defense Security Cooperation University, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, U.S. Department of Defense, “Chapter 1 Introduction to Security Cooperation,” Security Cooperation Management (aka DSCU Green Book), Edition 41.0, May 2021, <https://www.dscu.edu/documents/publications/greenbook/01_Chapter.pdf>)

Train and Equip/Security Cooperation: Title 10 Programs

Under the authority of Title 10, Chapter 16, and/or the current National Defense Authorization Act, DoD provides material assistance and related training to partner nations to develop specific capabilities and/or capacities. This is normally done using DoD Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding, but, in some instances, Congress appropriates additional funding for DoD to conduct these programs. Although it is DoD funding, these programs, and all security cooperation, must be coordinated with DoS. Security Cooperation practitioners refer to these programs as Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programs and execute them using a pseudo Letter of Offer and Acceptance. All BPC programs require congressional notification. Below are just a few examples. Examples with four digits in quotes represent temporary authorities whose authorizations can be found in various National Defense Authorizations Acts.

• “1022” Authority to Provide Counterdrug (CD)-Funded Support to Law Enforcement Agencies

• “1206” Training of Security Forces and Associated Security Ministries of Foreign Countries to Promote Respect for the Rule of Law and Human Rights

• “1226” Support to Certain Governments for Border Security Operations

• 333, Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build Capacity

• Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)

• European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)

• Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF)

• Counter ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF)

• Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative (MSI)

### N/L – Plan Cheap

#### Plan is cheap

Kelly 10 Terrence K. Kelly, principal mathematician at the RAND Corporation, former director of the RAND Homeland Security Research Division, formerly served for 20 years as a commissioned officer in the U.S. Army, positions included senior national security officer in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, PhD mathematics, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; Cathryn Quantic Thurston, Political Scientist at RAND, PhD Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University; Jennifer D. P. Moroney, senior political scientist at RAND, PhD international relations, University of Kent at Canterbury; and Charlotte Lynch, researcher at RAND; “Security Cooperation Organizations in the Country Team Options for Success,” RAND Corporation, 2010, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA517323.pdf> /GoGreen!

The U.S. military must plan for a wide range of security cooperation1 missions, ranging from “normal” peacetime security cooperation activities—such as building the long-term institutional and operational capabilities and capacity of key partners and allies, establishing and deepening relationships between the U.S. and partner militaries, and securing access to critical areas overseas—to managing quasi-operational efforts, such as managing foreign internal defense within the overall foreign policy objectives of the United States. Security cooperation, in the form of noncombat military-to-military activities, is a useful part of the military’s toolkit in conflict prevention.2 Although security cooperation requires a relatively small investment with respect to the overall efforts of the U.S. military, it can be a key enabler of the success of future U.S. military missions by shaping the environment and laying the groundwork for future coalition and stability operations with allies and partners.3

### N/L – Compartmentalized

#### AM&E is compartmentalized

Walther-Puri 21 Andrea Walther-Puri, PhD candidate, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, research focuses on the effects of U.S. military counterterrorism programs on longer-term security governance transformation in the Sahel, “Afghanistan: A Tragic Lesson of the US Military’s Flawed Approach to Capacity Building,” Just Security, 9-6-2021, <https://www.justsecurity.org/78086/afghanistan-a-tragic-lesson-of-the-us-militarys-flawed-approach-to-capacity-building/> /GoGreen!

The FY2017 NDAA also included a crucial development: the creation of an in-house AM&E workforce at DOD. The Defense Security Cooperation University was founded in September 2019, to uphold a common knowledge base across the workforce, mandate common professional standards through a required multi-tier certificate program, and prioritize continued intellectual development. To further bolster this in-house AM&E workforce and minimize dependence on third-party contractors, the NDAA mandated the establishment of teams dedicated to AM&E within the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and within each Geographic Combatant Command.

### N/U – Deprioritized

#### AM&E is already deprioritized

Cole 21 Emily Cole, program officer for governance, justice and security in the Applied Conflict Transformation Center at the U.S. Institute of Peace, MALD Fletcher School at Tufts University, BA Amherst College; and Dr. Calin Trenkov-Wermuth, security governance advisor at USIP, formerly worked at the U.N. Office of Counter-Terrorism, served in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, PhD, MA international relations, University of Cambridge, BA world politics Hamilton College; “To Consolidate Democracy, Change U.S. Security Assistance,” U.S. Institute of Peace, 12-16-2021, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/12/consolidate-democracy-change-us-security-assistance> /GoGreen!

2. Enforce assessment, monitoring and evaluation requirements. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act required better assessment, monitoring and evaluation of security sector assistance. U.S. government officials admit that this is not happening yet, and big strides need to be taken to implement and learn from security assistance monitoring and evaluation. This is one way to ensure programming is effective and that it helps broader strategic objectives, including the consolidation of democracy.

### U O/W – Requirements

#### AM&E is structurally inevitable – legally required! – and stuff’s been optimized

Maginnis 21 Robert Maginnis, contractor with Sigmatech Inc. supporting DASA (DE&C) as a global strategist, retired U.S. Army officer who recently completed 18 years with HQDA G-3/5/7 working security cooperation policy and training, MS management science, Naval Postgraduate School, BS engineering, United States Military Academy at West Point, graduate of numerous Army schools including the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College’s Strategy Course; and Michael Prater, principal adviser to the DASA (DE&C) for global security assistance and armaments cooperation, BBA acquisition and contracts management, Strayer University; “Security Cooperation Refresh,” Army AL&T Magazine, 9-2-2021, <https://asc.army.mil/web/news-security-cooperation-refresh/> /GoGreen!

Fortunately, those too often disjointed outcomes are now collapsing into a far more synergistic endeavor thanks to the National Defense Authorization Act of 2017, and in particular the codification of Title 10, Chapter 16, Security Cooperation.

Congress redefined nearly everything DOD does with a foreign partner as “security cooperation.” That definition includes not just exercises and information sharing—which is the traditional forte of operational forces—but the Army’s support of State Department-approved foreign military sales cases, direct commercial sales, the training provided to foreign partners at our schoolhouses and other programs as defined by Title 22 Security Assistance, a State Department authority executed by DOD.

Importantly, the new law mandates the creation of a formalized assessment, monitoring and evaluation efforts to foster more accurate and transparent reporting on the extent to which DOD achieves security cooperation outcomes and an evaluation of the reasons for success or lack thereof. This new accountability requirement intends to identify and disseminate best practices and lessons for security cooperation to inform decisions about policy, plans, programs and workforce. The law also requires an annual report to Congress on the measurable results of U.S. security cooperation investments.

Meanwhile, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation issued assessment, monitoring and evaluation guidance as well as produced helpful guides such as “Standards and Guidelines for Security Cooperation Assessment,” which provide security cooperation programs and activities with standards, guidelines and tools to inform decision-making. Much of this new guidance places the task of assessing, monitoring and evaluating the security cooperation investment on the executing unit or agency, and the results are collected annually by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation for a report to Congress.

MAJOR UPDATE

DOD publications updated as part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2017:

· Department of Defense Directive 5132.03, “DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation.”

· Department of Defense Instruction 5132.14, “Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise.”

· Department of Defense Instruction 5132.15, “Implementation of the Security Cooperation Workforce Certification Program.”

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s comprehensive and expanded mission, according to the agency’s website, is “to advance U.S. defense and foreign policy interests by building the capacity of foreign partners in order to encourage and enable allies and partners to respond to shared challenges.” Important aspects of the agency’s mission are the tasks of managing and training the department’s security cooperation workforce and demonstrating the return on program investments, all while continuing to perform their traditional core functions such as defense trade and arms transfer, institutional capability building and international education and training. Much of that mission passes to each of the military services for execution through a variety of new guidance like that for workforce certification.

CONVERGING EFFORTS

Understandably, the new DOD and Defense Security Cooperation Agency guidance resulted in the Army rethinking top-to-bottom how it engages with foreign partners and manages its workforce. Specifically, the materiel side of international engagement, the Army security assistance enterprise, led by DASA (DE&C), began to collaborate more closely with the operational forces headed by the Army’s G-3/5/7. That synergistic effort resulted in the formulation of new Army guidance for the security cooperation enterprise that more closely aligns with “General Order 2020-01, Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities within Headquarters, Department of the Army,” and updated critical guidance in security cooperation-related Army regulations.

This refreshed Army policy marriage—operational security cooperation and security assistance—optimizes Congress’ 2017 guidance by contributing to the service’s combat readiness and the effectiveness of our security assistance efforts. Further, it ensures a whole-of-Army approach, which aligns plans that equip and train allies and foreign partners to better contribute to the Army Campaign Plan, the service’s guidance for allocating resources and tasks to satisfy the DOD mandates.

NEW REGS

Army publications created or updated in response to DOD changes:

· Army Regulation 11-31, “Army Security Cooperation Policy.”

· Army Regulation 12-1, “Security Assistance, Training, and Export Policy.”

· Army Regulation 5-22, “The Army Force Modernization Proponent System.”

The Army validated this new relationship with a number of significant administrative and strategy documents. In particular, those documents include the designation of the Army chief of operations and DASA (DE&C) as the Army’s force modernization co-leads for security cooperation. These partners also co-developed the Army Strategy for Allies and Partners and three of its annexes: Implementation of Security Cooperation with Allies and Partners, the Global Prioritization Assessment and Country Specific Guidance.

#### There is no part of the government not on board, it just takes a while

O’Mahony 18 Angela O’Mahony, associate dean for academic affairs at Pardee RAND Graduate School and a senior political scientist at RAND, former assistant professor of international political economy and economic statecraft at the University of British Columbia, PhD political science, UCSD; Ilana Blum, researcher at RAND; Gabriela Armenta, researcher at RAND; Nicholas Burger, senior economist at RAND and director of RAND’s Washington office; Joshua Mendelsohn, researcher at RAND; Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland; Steven W. Popper, researcher at RAND; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; and Thomas S. Szayna, senior political scientist and former director of RAND's Defense and Political Sciences Department at RAND, MA international relations, Claremont Graduate School; “Assessing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Army Security Cooperation: A Framework for Implementation,” RR2165, RAND Corporation, 2018, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1056354.pdf> /GoGreen!

As Part I of this study discussed, Army security cooperation activities have aligned fairly well with what previous analyses have found contribute to effectiveness in both security cooperation and international development assistance. However, across the U.S. government, requirements for more rigorous and systematic AM&E are growing. The Army, with the rest of DoD, must improve its ability to analyze and report the extent to which its security cooperation activities are meeting their objectives. As Part I makes clear, there is still much to be learned. As the United States increases the scope of security cooperation, in terms of both activity and partner types, planners will need to understand not only what has been effective in the past but also how to identify lessons from the broader range of partners the United States is engaging. Part II of this study focuses on helping the Army develop an AM&E implementation framework that will better link security cooperation activities to their outcomes.

AM&E Developments—and Requirements—Are Accelerating

Within the past ten years, several developments have laid the foundations for a more strategic and analytically rigorous approach to security cooperation. As shown in Figure 4.1, these developments have arisen at several levels of government: Congress, the White House, OSD, DSCA, and combatant commands (CCMDs), and within the Army itself.

First, an important impetus for DoD’s recent efforts to improve the security cooperation AM&E process has come from Congress, some of whose members are eager for the department to improve its ability to track security cooperation resource expenditures and demonstrate the effectiveness of security cooperation programs in achieving DoD objectives at the national, theater, or country level. In Section 1202 of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress mandated that DoD work with the Department of State (DoS) to establish a strategic framework for security cooperation “to guide prioritization of resources and activities.” Furthermore, it specified that one of the elements of this strategic framework would be “a methodology for assessing the effectiveness of Department of Defense security cooperation programs in making progress toward achieving the primary objectives, priorities, and desired end-states . . . including an identification of key benchmarks for such progress.”1 The FY 2017 NDAA reiterates the previous NDAA’s call for a security **[Figure 4.1 OMITTED]** cooperation AM&E framework, but goes further by requiring an “independent assessment of defense security cooperation programs.”2

Second, the National Security Council laid the groundwork in 2013 for a more integrated approach to security sector assistance. Directed primarily at DoS and DoD, Presidential Policy Directive 23 (Security Sector Assistance Policy) called for “a deliberate and inclusive whole-of-government process that ensures alignment of activities and resources with [U.S.] national security priorities.” Among other things, this meant ensuring greater consistency between programs and objectives, fostering transparency and coordination across U.S. government agencies, building sustainable partner security capacity through comprehensive sector strategies, being more selective in the use of security assistance resources to achieve the greatest impact, and informing policy with rigorous analysis, assessment, and evaluations. According to the directive, this latter effort would involve introducing “common standards and expectations for assessing security cooperation requirements” as well as “investing in monitoring and evaluation of security sector assistance programs.” Although the emphasis was on greater standardization of AM&E policies and procedures throughout the security assistance sector, the directive did indicate that newly established “standards and data collection will take into account the varying security and information environments where U.S. programs operate.”3

Third, in 2016 OSD released Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise, which provides guidance for a “whole of DoD” approach to security cooperation AM&E. It asserts that “accountability and learning are the primary purposes” of AM&E, and highlights AM&E’s importance in demonstrating security cooperation’s “returns on investment” so policymakers might “identify and improve or eliminate ineffective initiatives” as well as garner evidentiary support for policy and legislative proposals.4

The DoDI specifies two main military service requirements in supporting CCMD AM&E: (1) an initial (country-level) assessment of the security cooperation environment and (2) an initial design document (IDD) for “significant” security cooperation initiatives. “The initial assessment provides an understanding of the context, conditions, partner capabilities, and requirements immediately before the implementation of security cooperation initiatives and other activities.” It informs initiative design and establishes a “baseline against which to track progress.” The IDD contains milestones and measures that allow for performance monitoring and “independent and rigorous evaluations” of initiative “relevance, effectiveness, and sustainability.”5 The IDD must also include a TOC.

Within the terms of the DoDI, the GCCs have the primary security cooperation AM&E role. Their responsibilities include (1) leading initial assessment efforts, (2) orchestrating the assessment process, (3) formulating IDDs for all significant initiatives, (4) monitoring all significant initiatives, and (5) submitting to DSCA all initial country assessments and IDDs for new security cooperation initiatives.6 Based on the analysis in this report, services play an important role in every step of the AM&E process, particularly for the activities they implement directly. ASCCs play a particularly important role linking Army security cooperation to GCCs’ initial assessment and IDD.

In addition to issuing the DoDI, OSD has encouraged the development of AM&E processes, for example, by highlighting the importance of AM&E in various other guidance documents and hosting DoD-wide and interagency workshops to share best practices. These efforts were accelerated and better integrated after OSD’s establishment of a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation in 2015. This office undertook several initiatives over the past two years, supported by RAND’s National Defense Research Institute, which focused on institutionalizing best practices in security cooperation planning, transparency, and AM&E.7

Fourth, innovative concepts for using technology to improve data collection have allowed hundreds of U.S. security cooperation practitioners around the globe to report on their activities in more methodical and comprehensive ways and for policymakers and program managers to provide more rigorous oversight. The creation of security cooperation management information systems by the GCCs and other DoD organizations provided unprecedented platforms for planning, resourcing, assessing, monitoring, and evaluating future security cooperation AM&E efforts. These largely independent initiatives have begun to coalesce in the form of a comprehensive tool for tracking DoD security cooperation activities and resources: G-TSCMIS, whose development is being managed by DSCA (with support from the Joint Staff) and is required to be used by all DoD security cooperation activity managers. G-TSCMIS is still a work in progress, and CCMDs face challenges getting all relevant activities included in the system.8 Still, even when G-TSCMIS is fully developed and widely used, it will not fulfill all the information management needs required for effective security cooperation planning and AM&E, which is why the CCMDs and other security cooperation organizations continue to use their own systems.

In addition to overseeing the development of G-TSCMIS, DSCA has also recently launched an initiative to formalize security cooperation workforce competencies and associated experiential and training requirements, which could eventually contribute to a larger pool of qualified AM&E professionals within the security cooperation field.

Fifth, the Joint Staff has also played an important role in attempting to improve and standardize security cooperation and security force assistance (SFA) doctrine, including with respect to AM&E. Acknowledging the challenge of determining the extent to which security cooperation activities have contributed to U.S. objectives, the draft Joint Publication 3-20 provides guidelines for three kinds of security cooperation assessments: operations assessments (which focus on “are we doing the right things”), task assessments (which focus on “are we doing things right”), and functional assessments (which focus on “are we efficient and effective”).9

Sixth, OSD established theater campaign plans (TCPs) for CCMDs and campaign support plans for the military services as a way of applying military planning techniques beyond traditional war plans to incorporate more steady-state activities like security cooperation. These plans allowed for a Secretary of Defense–led analysis and discussion of security cooperation ends, ways, and means that did not exist before. More recently, the CCMDs have begun to develop country plans that promise a clear auditing trail between theater objectives and the means (activities and resources) employed to achieve them that involve U.S. allies and partner nations, given appropriate country objectives and metrics as well as improved country-level data collection.